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Jungian Archetypes: A Step Towards 
Scientific Enquiry 
 
Abstract 
   The Jungian archetypes and transformations are often branded as pseudoscientific and 
difficult to ontologically define. This has led to problems in testing and a scarcity of papers 
attempting to scientifically explore this phenomenon. This paper explores why that has 
historically been the case and critically examines our current scientific standards and how 
they might be applied to the archetypes. The paper remains critical of a purely positivist 
paradigm, but concludes that some testability is necessary for the ethical application of the 
theory; its continued relevance in Psychology; and to ease current tensions in the field so that 
each side (those who champion the material and those who champion the experiential) may 
benefit from the other in refining this theory. I finish by presenting an account of the 
archetypes and transformations that focuses on the observable aspects of the phenomenon, 
and how they may be explained by recent findings in Neuroaesthetics and image schemata, 
while not denying the existence of the experiential aspects, e.g. the numinous quality of the 
archetypes, or their role in individuation. It is hoped that this will enable testing in some 
capacity and position the archetypes and transformations as an experiential and material 
phenomenon, being neither held on a precious, untestable pedestal, nor reduced to a set of 
fragmented parts, disconnected from their history. 
 
Introduction 
   The following thesis will explore the concept of the archetypes and their transformations. 
With the increasing relevance of religion and climate crisis in the political landscape 
(Kashima 2016, cited in Saroglou, 2016), the theory of the archetypes may prove to be a 
valuable tool to understand our world and give our lives deeper meaning. However, this will 
only be the case if they can be shown to be sufficiently evidenced. At present, there have 
been very few scientific studies which attempt to test the phenomenon of the archetypes, and 
Jung’s work is often written off as pseudoscientific due to the many barriers that have stood 
in the way of scientific enquiry.  
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   This work will therefore aim to outline the archetypes as they were initially conceptualised 
by Jung, exploring some examples, from the collective through to the individual 
representations. With this outlined, I will discuss the issues with ontology which plagued 
Jung’s work since its conception and continue to cause contention today. For example, 
researchers such as Laughlin and Tiberia (2012) have stated that “The archetypes are either 
inherent systems of neural circuitry, or they do not exist. It is as simple as that” (p.140). 
Meanwhile, developmental researchers such as Knox (2010) have argued that “Domain‐
specificity not only does not have to be pre‐existent, it cannot be pre‐existent” (p.523), i.e. 
that symbolic thought cannot be determined by our genetics. By offering potential 
explanations of why Jung appears ontologically vague (Palmer, 1997) in his initial 
conception of the archetypes, it is my hope that it will be possible to gain deeper insight into 
the nature of the archetypes (and the appropriate methodology for their study), which is one 
of the key issues which stands in the way of further scientific enquiry.  
 
  With ontology (and some of Jung’s background) established, I will further explore why this 
work matters, and attempt to provide a breakdown of the original theory of the archetypes 
and collective unconscious to make it more accessible to the casual reader. This in itself is a 
valuable step, as at present, Jung’s work can seem esoteric to the extent of dissuading 
engagement, and the frequent personification of concepts may in itself be unappealing to the 
modern scientific reader (Storr, 1973). Additionally, the field itself is rife with different uses 
of each relevant term, often making it difficult to discern what phenomenon is actually being 
explored in each new article. Most importantly though, this breakdown will, hopefully, create 
a clearer path for establishing clear hypotheses regarding the original hypotheses, which can 
be theoretically explored and tested.  
 
   Following this, I will give some background on falsification, why it matters (and why it 
does not) and use the breakdown of ideas to explore how Jung’s theory stands up against 
modern ideas of falsifiability. After establishing the shortfalls of the theory, I will then 
explore modern conceptualisations of the archetypes and transformations (particularly that of 
Knox, 2004, and Merchant, 2009) to see if these can be resolved, and finally offer a re-
conceptualisation of Jungian theory which is underpinned by the subjective but encompasses 
modern psychological research to explain the observable phenomenon. This will be used to 
suggest a clearer route to scientific enquiry, while aiming not to lose the heart of the original 
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theory. It is my hope that this will contribute at least one piece towards the puzzle that is the 
archetypes.  
 
Jung and the Psyche 
  The Collective Unconscious and the Archetypes are concepts originating from the theory 
and life’s work of Carl Gustav Jung. The collective unconscious is a broad concept which can 
simplistically be described as a theoretical substratum of human consciousness which gives 
rise to universal ideas and patterns of behaviour (known as archetypes). However, this 
explanation is not satisfactory when trying to understand, for example, the role of archetypes 
in the supposedly compensatory function of dreams, or how an individual’s relationship with 
the archetypes may be used to understand their complexes or delusions. In order to fully 
grasp Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious and the archetypes, it is first necessary to 
understand some of Jung’s ideas about consciousness and a few of the concepts that Jung 
borrowed from the natural sciences, used analogously to outline psychic functioning1.  
 
  Within his clinical work with patients, Jung observed an estimated 80,000 dreams (Von 
Franz, 1964), wherein similar symbols (spontaneous images with underlying meaning) 
appeared across different individuals. In some cases, these symbols seemed to have esoteric 
roots, as in mythology or obscure texts which he believed to be outside of the patient’s realm 
of knowledge. One notable (and slightly outlandish, but resultantly memorable) instance of 
this is the solar phallus example, wherein Jung discusses a schizophrenic patient he 
encountered at Berghölzi Mental Hospital. Jung describes the patient tilting his head by the 
window and urging Jung to stand with him and do the same, that he might see “the sun’s 
penis” (1936/37/1975, p.51, CW 8, para. 105), which he claims controls the wind. At the 
time, Jung dismissed this as the man being “crazy” (1935/1977, p.41, CW 18, para. 85). Four 
years after the event, Jung discovered a book on mythology by Albert Dietrich, which 
included an exploration of a ritual for the God ‘Mithras’ (Jung, 1936/37/1975). The origins of 
this God remain contested, but it is notable that Mithras has many associations with the sun, 
including his birth supposedly coinciding with that of the official sun God (Natalis Invicti), 
 
 
1 The word 'psychic' here is used to mean 'pertaining to the mental world', as it was used by Jung throughout his 
works. 
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being depicted as dining with Sol (Roman sun God), and being assigned at the seat of the 
equinoxes framed by Cautes and Cautopates for the solstices (all, of course, with relation to 
the position of the sun. In the Mithraic cult, this bore symbolic relation to life, death and the 
journey through immortality) (Beck, 2000). The book included a ritual which explicitly 
included breathing in the rays of the sun and bringing oneself into a mental state where they 
would become able to see the sun from an aerial position. From here, it would be possible to 
see a tube running from the sun which controlled the winds. Upon checking the publication 
date, Jung found that this information had been published in 1910 (Jung, 1936/37), four years 
after the institutionalisation of the patient (Merchant, 2009). This led him to conclude that it 
was not possible that the patient had come across this image before and merely replicated it. 
Jung determined it was highly unlikely that such a similar image would appear as a matter of 
coincidence, and that there must be an underlying basis for the similarity that he believed 
superseded typical conscious experience. It was a collection of experiences such as these 
which led Jung to generate his initial hypotheses regarding the collective unconscious and the 
archetypes.  
 
  This initial insinuation brought a great deal of criticism and accusations of Lamarckianism 
(believing that one can genetically pass on traits inherited during a lifetime) to Jung’s work. It 
is important to note here that at least by the end of his career, Jung was not suggesting that 
the archetypes were specific images that could be inherited, as the above might imply. By 
contrast, Jung eventually appeared to lean towards a more general notion of the archetypes, 
i.e. in Jung’s foreword to Harding (1948/1977) he explicitly states that an archetype is not 
“an inherited idea but rather an inherited mode of psychic functioning” (p.518, CW 18. para 
1228). The archetypes should therefore be thought of as a mode of psychic functioning which 
gives rise to patterns of thoughts and behaviour. These patterns appear to share 
commonalities in both function and often appearance.  
 
   Jung posited that the psyche has a tripartite structure comprising of consciousness, the 
personal unconscious and the collective unconscious (McGuigan, 2009). Consciousness is the 
store of individual experiences that can be recalled at will, explored and re-experienced. The 
personal unconsciousness similarly arises from individual experiences but cannot be readily 
recalled, or re-experienced, while the collective unconscious is the root of the archetypes, 
which are a set of tendencies or instincts (which can be applied to thought or behaviour) 
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which do not arise from personal experience and are transcultural and resistant to temporal 
change. Akin to the personal unconscious, these cannot be consciously accessed but only be 
observed through their secondary manifestations i.e. the archetypal ‘transformations’ 
(Laughlin & Tiberia, 2012). ‘Transformations’ here will be used to describe the symbol itself, 
arising from the underlying archetypal structure. Transformations are the way that the 
archetype manifests in a particular image or concept which usually surfaces through dreams, 
fantasies or visions; even the most idiosyncratic personal fantasies can hold universal 
qualities. For example, Jung worked with a psychotic patient, Miss Miller (pseudonym), who 
experienced visions and chaotic dreams and created literature based off the experience (Jung, 
1952a/1967). In one of her works, ‘Songs of the Moth’, the moth’s search for the sun is made 
a metaphor for her own desire for God and as is highlighted by Jung, this comparison of God 
with the Sun is a common theme, extending beyond her own time and geographical location; 
it can also be found in Mithraic liturgy, Egyptian symbolism and the poetry of Goethe and 
Nietzche (Palmer, 1997). Here, for example, the transformation is the Sun (being the direct 
symbol) as a representation of the ‘God’ archetype.  
 
   In explaining the relationship between these structures, Jung makes use of the concept of 
enantiodromia (Palmer, 1997), a Heraceitean concept which suggests that ‘opposites generate 
opposites’ (largely akin to Newton’s third law, ‘for every action, there is an equal and 
opposite reaction’) and that all opposites eventually meet (similar to the ‘as above, so below’ 
concept outlined in the Kybalion (Three Initiates, 1908)). On the basis of this assumption, 
Jung suggests it must therefore be that everything we hold in our conscious minds must have 
an equal and opposite in the unconscious. Although Jung went on to call Freud’s Totem and 
Taboo (1913) a “fanciful assumption” (Jung, 1953a/1977, p.440, CW 18, para. 1074) later in 
his career, there is a similarity between the two core assumptions of their work which is 
relevant here and most concisely illustrated in Totem and Taboo. Freud (1913) suggests that 
if a taboo exists, then it must be the highest desire of the individual or the group, for if there 
is no desire for an object, then there is no need for prohibitions against it. The development of 
a ‘taboo’ or scorn towards any object or action is thus an internal preventative action towards 
a pre-existing want. The standpoint is that a ‘block’ against a desire is generally formed of 
either complexes in the self, or social convention. In Jungian terms, the desire for a prohibited 
object or action would be made unconscious, and cause the conscious mind to apply equal 
and opposite pressure to repress it, which causes a lack of overall psychological balance as a 
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high level of energy is being expended in a single area, e.g. a virgin who wishes to appear 
chaste but who has a powerful desire for sex, may develop an outward obsession with 
portraying sex as contemptible, or a paranoia that others believe their virginity is in question. 
The sexual obsession itself will make itself known, simply in a way that is considered 
acceptable for the conscious mind, and since the true function of this behaviour remains 
unfulfilled, this obsessive behaviour will continue. These blocks, for Jung, are the primary 
cause of neurosis. However, he differs from Freud in that he suggests that these desires are 
not primarily sexual (Jung, 1953a/1997), and that problems can arise across whole the 
spectrum of human experience. This led to Jung’s belief that his task as a clinician was to 
create a unio mentalis (Jung, 1964), more commonly referred to in Jungian psychology as 
individuation (achieving mental balance, where neither conscious or unconscious content are 
causing undue stress on the other). Most typically, this was achieved by making unconscious 
content, conscious. 
 
   In situations where conscious boundaries were lowered, Jung believed it was possible to see 
the cause of neurosis in the unconscious manifestations, such as in fantasies, delusions, and 
dreams. Across his observations of these, he noticed recurrent themes, inclusive of figures, 
environments, and situations. Jung found that these themes ran parallel to many primitive 
ideas, myths and rites (Jung, 1964), which he believed to be indicative of a kind of cultural 
psyche that extends beyond the individual. To explain the recurring patterns, Jung 
hypothesised the existence of archetypes and the collective unconscious. 
 
The Archetypes and Collective Unconscious 
    The way the archetypes emerge is multi-fold, but most noticeably, they are recognisable as 
repeated ideas or situations which appear across time and culture. The archetype is more akin 
to a template, a repeated pattern of functions and properties which can assume many different 
forms. To illustrate this, we will explore the Mother archetype, shifting from collective to 
individual representations and the different forms the archetype can take. The Mother 
archetype typically emerges in aspects of life related to fertility, nurturing, containment and 
other common maternal associations (Jung, 1952b/1967). This following exploration will 
allow us to look concretely at the core phenomenon that Jung was attempting to explain with 
his theory of the archetypes. 
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    There are a variety of collective representations which may be a branch of the core Mother 
archetype, but the one we will focus on here is that of the Earth Mother. Following the 
Neolithic revolution (circa 10,000 BCE), wherein hunter-gatherer societies transitioned into 
agriculture and farming, there are many accounts of the idea of the Earth Mother which 
appear across different times and cultures. The early Earth Mother concepts centered around 
ideas of fertility and nourishment of the earth, but also ruthlessness, violence and death which 
in turn brings new life, reflecting the everyday man’s experience of harvesting and hunting. 
The pervasiveness of this notion of Earth as Mother is observable in many early religious and 
cultural beliefs; Armstrong (2005) provides a list of figures which act as collective 
representations of this notion - in Syra, Asherah or Anat; in Sumer, Inanna; In Egypt, Isis; in 
Greece, Hera, Demeter and Aphrodite. The idea of the Earth as the mother and ultimate 
source of all life extended to such a degree that the fifth mythical king of Athens, 
Erechtonius, was even said to have been born from sacred soil rather than a physical womb 
(Armstrong, 2005). Jung (1952b/1967) outlines shared rituals and beliefs which stem from 
this idea, such as European ideas of a King being considered as marrying the land itself upon 
coronation, and their luck being reflected in the yield of the harvests. Jung (1952b/1967 
highlights the story of Domalde, a mythical Swedish king who was executed on his third year 
for crop failure, and also outlines the old Chinese custom of emperors ploughing a furrow 
upon their ascension; their rule is also considered to be a union with the land, as a feminine 
body. Interestingly, Armstrong (2005) notes that the earth was not always regarded as female 
in China and Japan and only became so when the dawn of farming and the maternal role of 
women aligned in their history, which appears to indicate some connection between physical 
circumstance and the development of the archetypes, or at least their expression. We can 
therefore see that regardless of location, the Earth as Mother concept was an idea that 
repeatedly emerged and gained cultural popularity.  
  
    As a nod towards being temporally enduring, as Jung determined the archetypes must be, 
we need only glance towards the familiarity of the term 'Mother Nature', a highly common 
phrase in Western society, to see that the association with the Earth and the feminine mother 
has not largely changed – and interestingly, nor has the general principle of agriculture. Seeds 
are still sewn into the earth, crops are still harvested, words like 'fertile' are still used to 
describe good land, and we depend still upon the whims of the nature to determine whether or 
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not the food will grow. This is to a lesser or greater degree depending what part of the world 
one lives in, but the fact itself has not largely changed since the Neolithic era. The continued 
idea of humans as ‘born from the earth’, akin to Erechtonius, may also be suggested by the 
symbolic significance of the scythe carried by the typical figure of death. Lakoff (2015) 
discusses this figure in his lecture on the embodiment hypothesis, and suggests that the 
psychological significance of the scythe, as a common agricultural tool, is that we continue to 
view ourselves as plants in the life cycle (which he notes is also evident in phrases such as 
'young saplings' or 'sewing seeds'), with death as the figure that would cut us down in our 
prime, like a farmer at harvest. This demonstrates that despite thousands of years passing in 
between, the concept of Earth as Mother persists today, indicating what Jung considered a 
temporal resistance to change.  
 
   Although the Earth Mother is a widespread manifestation of what Jung termed the Mother 
archetype, it is by no means the only one. The Mother archetype is thoroughly illuminated 
and elaborated on by Jung himself (1954a/1975), and in this explanation, Jung states that the 
archetype can manifest itself in anything from the literal mother (or stepmother) figure, to 
more abstract symbols like the mythological Demeter, the religious Virgin Mary, or physical 
symbols such as water, churches or ovens. At first glance, the links between these objects 
seem tenuous but Jung goes on to state that traces of the Mother archetype can be found in 
anything that possesses the following traits: it inspires devotion or awe, has connotations of 
fertility and fruitfulness, is protective or hollow (in reference to the womb), or is found to be 
helpful or nurturing. Due to the essential element of duality in Jung’s theories 
(internal/external, positive/negative), the mother archetype also has a negative set of 
manifestations which Jung (1954a/1975) states may manifest in figures akin to the Goddesses 
of fate, such as the Moirai in Greek, or Norns in Norse mythology. These three are female 
entities which preside over life and death, sometimes as witches or other unearthly beings 
such as giantesses which hold immense power over mortal life. The negative mother 
archetype can also be found in any ‘devouring’ or entwining animals such as dragons, or 
serpents and can also be symbolised by deep waters or the grave. The last two of these returns 
us again to the idea of containment or a hollow, only this womb brings death rather than life. 
Jung himself recognises that this list is not exhaustive and is explicit in saying that these 
transformations are not always related to the literal mother herself, but the idea of a mother 
figure. 
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   This concept will be further explored below to illustrate how archetypes and their 
transformations may manifest in individual representations as opposed to the collective 
representations like the folklore or mythology mentioned above. However, this can often 
blend as the individual may subconsciously borrow from the collective, or alternatively the 
representation may be altogether unique to their life and experiences. The form that an 
archetype takes can depend on a wide variety of factors. Although collective representations 
(such as folklore) may share some uniformity, the same is not true always within the 
individual (Jung, 1954a/1975), as the archetype is subject to sociocultural and personal 
elaboration prior to expression. Jung (1954a/1975) also makes a point of the stating that since 
the archetypes are not the images in themselves, the way they manifest is a matter of “infinite 
variety” (Jung, 1954a/1975, p.81, CW 9 pt.1, para 156). 
 
  Merchant (2009) outlines one of the individual experiences with the negative mother 
archetype, drawn from Jung's (1931/1991, cited in Merchant 2009) work on the structure of 
the psyche. An army officer, who was a patient of Jung's, was displaying a set of psychogenic 
symptoms - a heart pain, a choking sensation, and a sharp pain in his left heel. Prior to the 
onset of these symptoms, the man had been in a relationship, but the woman had then left him 
for another man. Jung eventually determined that the heart pain and choking sensation were 
the result of unconscious affect - the man's broken heart, and the sensation of a 'lump in his 
throat' caused by repressed tears, both of which disappeared upon expression. This did not 
account for the sharp pain in his heel, and so the therapy continued. Subsequently, the man 
dreamed that he was bitten in the heel by a snake, and that he was instantly paralysed by this 
attack. During the discussion of this dream, the man revealed that his mother had pampered 
him which in turn led to a femininity of character that did not serve him well in school, nor in 
the military where he had sought to subdue this side of himself. As Merchant (2009) points 
out, the snake is a common biblical motif, representing corruption and downfall, and a loss of 
potential from what could have been. Merchant (2009) also indicates that it is highly likely 
that the man would have heard the Genesis story in early life, and so the unconscious, finding 
this an appropriate symbol for his feelings of betrayal from his mother and girlfriend, draws 
on this to describe how he has been “lamed” (Jung 1931/1999, cited in Merchant 2009). In 
this instance, we arguably see the unconscious mind drawing on a common collective 
Jungian Archetypes: A Step Towards Scientific Enquiry - Kyah McDonald 
 
13 
 
representation to express itself. However, the symbols that the mind utilises can be altogether 
more personal in nature.  
 
  One such case of this can be found in the Miller Fantasies, a collection of writings wherein 
Jung (1952b/1967) analysed the fantasies and what he described as 'visions' of Miss Frank 
Miller. In one of these visions, Miss Miller was centered in a dream-like city. This city held 
clear importance to Miss Miller and was described as being ardently longed for, and which is 
likened to heavenly Jerusalem by Jung. Here, the figure that stands in for the mother 
archetype is not a figure at all, but a setting - a place which contains 'crowds' of citizens and 
provides them with care and sustenance. The city thereby serves the function of the mother 
archetype as a container and provider of life, although the transformation itself is quite 
distinct from those laid out above. Jung (1952b/1967) also draws a parallel between this city 
and the Jerusalem and Babylon of the Old Testament, as these are also spoken about like 
women and referred to with phrases such as 'harlots' or 'the lady of Kingdoms'. This trend 
indicates the continuity of thought between the individual and the collective, which 
characterises the collective unconscious.  
 
   Jung’s perception of reality as the interplay of psychic factors underpins the significance of 
the archetypes in day to day life; since the world we live in is a matter of conscious 
perception, interactions with others are really interactions with ourselves, and our relationship 
with different parts of ourselves can shape our life experiences and our attitudes towards 
others. To utilise the archetype explored above, a person who has repeatedly internalised the 
negative mother as their conscious attitude may deeply resent or be dismissive towards 
anything which shares abstract properties with the mother archetype. Equally, it seems 
possible by extension that a nation-state which has developed a poor relationship with the 
Mother archetype may take reckless attitudes towards agricultural policies and the continued 
vitality of the earth itself. However, in accordance with the duality assumptions outlined 
earlier, they may also have a private desire to be aligned with the abstract properties of the 
mother archetype, e.g. the desire to feel protected and feel devotion (which would emerge in 
dreams or fantasies) which would need to be fulfilled in order to establish mental balance. 
The issue this potential for dual outcome produces is that of difficulties in falsifying the 
theory, i.e. providing potential conditions under which the theory could be shown to be false 
as opposite outcomes could still both be used to support the theory with ad hoc reasoning to 
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explain the outcome; the only thing that would not be expected is apathy. At present, there 
has been little work to determine which factors would determine which of the outcomes 
would emerge, and indeed, there may be a multitude of hidden variables involved in shaping 
this.  
 
Science, Ontology and the Archetypes 
 
  What has been presented thus far largely focuses on the experiential aspect of the archetypes 
as opposed to their potential material basis. This is primarily due to the fact that Jung’s 
writings were generated from idiographic practises with clients rather than through 
experimental methodology. When exploring the original theory, there is therefore much more 
information to present on the subjective aspect. However, Jung was keen to highlight that he 
did believe that there was a biological basis to the archetypes. In 1948(/1977), he wrote: 
 
“Of course, this term [the archetype] is not meant to denote an inherited idea but 
rather an inherited mode of psychic functioning, corresponding to the inborn way in 
which the chick emerges from the egg, the bird builds its nest, a certain kind of wasp 
stings the motor ganglion of the caterpillar, and eels find their way to the Bermudas. 
In other words, it is the “pattern of behaviour”. This aspect of the archetype, the 
purely biological one, is the proper concern of scientific psychology.” (p.518, CW 18. 
para 1228) 
 
 Jung is often charged with the accusation that he is ontologically vague (Palmer, 1997), 
which makes a biological basis arguably hard or impossible to determine. The discourse 
surrounding this likely emerges because Jung stresses that the archetypes are not reducible to 
biological processes and that they cannot be channelled into concrete reality (Jung, 
1953b/1977). As Mill’s (2012) highlights, Jung’s implicit supernaturalism has drawn much 
criticism, particularly considering the apparent God-like implications of a structure which is 
supra-individual, transcends time and culture and is all too frequently personified, implying 
that the archetypes have a kind of autonomy independent of the individual. In reality, these 
descriptions are more likely to be a reflection of Jung’s attempts to capture both the 
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subjective experience and the objective reality of the archetypes in a single sentiment. 
 
   In modern psychology, the tendency to view subjective and material as a dichotomy makes 
this position hard to reconcile in the current paradigm; an object is considered concrete or 
abstract rather than both. For example, it is more common to see love primarily as an abstract 
concept and to focus on its affective significance rather than its biological basis, or vice 
versa, it is more common to view a chair primarily as material object rather than having 
affective significance. This mode of thought can make it difficult to place the archetypes; 
abstract, or material? If Jung viewed the archetypes as purely metaphysical as implied above, 
this would make them problematic for the modern psychological community as it arguably 
precludes them from scientific study (explored further below). However, it seems that in 
reality, Jung was equally interested in both the empirical2 basis and experiential aspect of the 
archetypes, once stating that “we can therefore speak of an unconscious only in so far as we 
are able to demonstrate its contents” (Jung, 1954b, p.4, CW 9, p.1, para 4).  
    
 A thorough study of the archetypes must therefore aim to be scientific and replicable and yet 
it must also capture the subjective experience. Although this has caused issues for the 
scientific acceptance of the archetypes (as an archetypal experience is extremely difficult to 
generate or externally validate, and only being able to study something through its secondary 
effects is far from ideal), this is not necessarily a bad thing; Knox (2004) captures the 
sentiment well when discussing the position of neuroscience in psychoanalysis and the 
importance of the subjective element, stating that “the brain does not have to be studied at the 
expense of the mind” (p.2). This leads us neatly into the following discussion - could the 
archetypes be studied scientifically? And what is it, precisely, that we mean by 'science'? 
Jung and Science 
 
  In order to fully understand how the archetypes and collective unconscious were conceived 
within the sciences (and what their position is there) one must first understand the societal 
 
 
2 ‘Empiricism’ is defined here as the view that observations from the senses (especially those which are 
quantifiable) are the main way to ‘know’ or gain knowledge about reality (Hjørland, 2005), with the exclusion 
of introspection, intuition or metaphysics. ‘Empirical’ equally is used to mean study through observations which 
can be gained through the senses, with the same exclusions applied. 
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context that Jung was emerging from, and what bearing this had on his ideas of science. It is 
no secret that Jung’s work has been the subject of controversy. Throughout the course of his 
career, he produced titles such as ‘Psychology and Alchemy’, routinely delved into the occult 
and as previously mentioned, held to the Hermetic Law of Correspondence; (Jung, 
1929/1975, p.9, CW 15, para. 12) “… everything without is within, everything above is 
below. Between all things … reigns “correspondence” (correspondentia)…”. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that Jung was and is frequently charged with accusations of mysticism. This 
reputation has only acted to cast further doubt on his theory of the collective unconscious as a 
scientific concept. As Jones (2014) highlights, there are also suggestions that Jung’s work 
was not scientific and cannot be scientific because of its basis in analytical psychology. To 
assess this claim, it is initially important to discuss, in a broad sense, what science is and what 
it will be used to mean throughout this paper, beginning with its etymological root.  
 
   The word 'science' stems from the Latin 'scientia' which simply means knowledge, or what 
is known. It is therefore impossible to go further without recognising that this is a discussion 
of epistemology, since this is inherently a conversation about what it is to know, and by 
which means we are capable of knowing. The writer has no intention of attempting to resolve 
this question, but it is sufficient to know that there are at least two derivatives of 'science' or 
‘ways to know’ which will be relevant for the following discussion. Having an awareness of 
both strands will not only help to understand the apparently conflicting ontology of the 
archetypes but will also shed light on the narrower scope of ‘science’ as we know it now.  
 
  The reasoning for the existence of these two derivatives of science, as outlined by Cambray 
(2014), is not wholly academic, but also historical and socio-political. By the end of the 
Enlightenment era, both the science of England and France had largely been brought under 
the wing of their respective national agendas (Cambray, 2014). Anglo-French science 
dominated the field, prizing rationality and objectivity at the expense of subjectivity and the 
arts. In response, Germany had developed a science that was more independent of state-
interest and which retained its holistic viewpoint. It also made less differentiation between the 
arts and science, and is best known as Wissenschaft. Cambray (2014) suggests that this was, 
in part, a result of central Europe being embroiled in the 30 year war in 1618-1648. The 
human capital involved in this (20% of the German population, and eight million fatalities in 
total (Clodfelter, 2017)), combined with the time period of the war, meant that Germany was 
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largely cut off from other centres of scientific thought during the dawn of the Enlightenment 
period, and thus did not share the influences of the science of England and France.  
 
Anglo-French Science 
   The science of England and France that developed during the Enlightenment era was 
characterised by knowledge discovered and collected via empirical methods. Objectivity was 
prized, along with the ability to investigate through observation and replicate results through 
the scientific method. Mathematical grounding was and is also important for the sciences 
which belong to this derivative, particularly as this form of systematisation theoretically 
increases objectivity; relations between elements can be described by equations without need 
for subjective interpretation. The empirical method brought great gains for the quality of life 
of mankind, and had a direct impact on national interest; Lawrence (1999) suggests that the 
Enlightenment period brought with it a view of human perfection in the future, and placed 
itself as the hallmark of progression. However, implication of this was that cultures not part 
of this trend were considered ‘behind’ and in need of education, thus creating the necessary 
ethical grounds for imperialism (Lawrence, 1999). This new socio-political shift thus 
resituated science, both as the basis of ethical justification for proponents to consider 
themselves teleologically ‘forwards’ (Shank 2008), and as a key means production of 
weaponry and medicine that could be used for military purposes. The furtherance of science 
had thus become politically and socially relevant, leading to an increase in state-funded 
expeditions. These provided a profitable and largely successful form of knowledge collection 
for scientists of the time (Cambray, 2014). As a result of this, the trend of knowledge 
collection shifted towards utilising the scientific method for ends which would have 
economic, political or military use, as these were more likely to garner funding and high 
societal status. This therefore became socially lauded as the hallmark of good scientific 
practise and was purportedly the foundation of scientists such as Banks (prolific botanist), 
Newton (mathematical physics) and Boyle (one of the founders of chemistry) (examples from 
Cambray, 2014).    
 
   However, Cambray (2014) highlights that although Boyle and Newton are famed today for 
their empirical findings, there is often little mention that they also studied alchemy, which 
Newton wrote about more than physics, and which Boyle held a life-long interest in 
(alongside transmutation). These interests were beyond the quantifiable, and yet increasingly 
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became edited out of their history. As Shank (2008) suggests, the narrative that this creates is 
that these key findings were a natural result of scientific progression and the Enlightenment 
era, rather than arising from a complex social and philosophical backdrop, over-emphasising 
the role of the former and minimising the role of the latter. It may be argued that these 
interests were no longer mentioned due to their decreased relevance to society, but the result 
is that the breadth of their views and interests have been largely minimised in the retelling 
(Cambray, 2014), and the rich philosophical foundations that underpinned some of the 
greatest scientific findings in European history are thus diminished if not publicly erased. 
Thus, by the end of the Enlightenment era, the holistic backdrop for progressive thought had 
been replaced with an empirical gold standard, based purely in rationality, reason and strict 
scientific method. The subjective was framed as lesser and deemed largely irrelevant to the 
field of science. In this sense, the situation has not much changed today, and we continue to 
emulate a great scientific past divorced from philosophy and the subjective - a past which 
simply did not exist.  
 
  To illustrate this; within modern Psychology the gathering of knowledge outside of state 
purposes is often still considered frivolous, and it is commonplace that a rationale will 
include notes on potential practical applications to justify why a study is ‘worthwhile’, as if 
the pursuit of knowledge in itself is insufficient. The pressure to create socially significant 
and economically beneficial research still weighs heavy on UK universities, as funding bids 
remain crucial to a researcher’s position, prestige and livelihood. A glance towards these 
should illustrate well for the modern audience the very real pressures and biases that have 
been faced by science since the 1700s. These socio-political factors have in turn shaped the 
values and attitudes within the field of science and should be kept in mind when we consider 
the attributed importance or reputation of any given theory in the field.  
 
Wissenschaft 
   The second form of science, which we will refer to simply as Wissenschaft3. Saban (2014) 
quotes one of Jung's letters, in which he states that '[On the continent] any kind of adequate 
 
 
3 There are multiple forms of Wissenschaft, such as schöne Wissenschaften (“fine sciences”) and höhere 
Wissenschaften (“high sciences”) but for the sake of the argument here, ‘Wissenschaft’ itself will be sufficient. 
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logical and systematic approach is called "scientific"' or ‘Wissenschaft’. As a result of this, 
History, Mythology and Zoology are all considered types of sciences, falling under the 
broader and earlier definition of science as 'knowledge collection' (Saban, 2014). This is far 
more inclusive of a wide range of methodology and can therefore also be applied to those 
fields which also contain elements which are harder to mathematically describe such as 
History or Anthropology. Since this approach retained its independence from state, it is also 
more open to information gathering that is not centred around social purposes and 
application. For example, poetry, before Kant, was once considered a form of Wissenschaft, 
since it is comprised of the systematic rules that underpinned the construction of a poem, and 
the capacity produce it (Bommel, 2015). Beauty was likewise studied through repeated 
examples and rules (Bommel, 2015). Within Wissenschaft, hermeneutics was therefore not 
cut off from systematised knowledge collection in the way that it came to be within Anglo-
French science. In fact, it was central to the concept of ‘the true, the good and the beautiful’ 
propagated by the influential German philosopher, Herder (Bommel, 2015), and the Sturm 
and Drang movement he backed between the 1760s and 1780s. The Sturm and Drang 
movement prized the expression of emotion and ran counter to the Enlightenment movement, 
opposing the reductive elements of rationalism, which was perceived as largely cutting the 
subjective element from human study.  
 
    Both Cambray (2014) and Saban (2014) highlight Goethe as a prime example of 
Wissenschaft in their essays on Jung and science. Goethe (1749-1832) suggests that the 
nature of a phenomenon is both material and immaterial – art and science. For Goethe, 
science was inherently hermeneutic. In fact, this view was originally more common as facts 
were not considered something that was ‘out there’ but something that was made between the 
observer and the phenomenon they were observing (Saban, 2014), hence the root of the word 
‘fact’ being the Latin ‘facere’ which means ‘to do’ or ‘to make’. Since things are experienced 
both objectively and subjectively, Goethe believed that it was necessary to describe both in 
order to capture the true essence of a thing. This trend was not exclusive to Germanic science 
and can also be seen in Banks’ notes from the James Cook expeditions, which also included 
rich experiential descriptions of phenomena which largely influenced the emergence of 
Romanticism, and writers such as Shelley and Keats (Cambray, 2014).  
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Social Implications and the Jungian Community 
   It is important to acknowledge that neither of these derivatives should be considered 
dominant or subordinate as neither can, without question, be said to be better or worse than 
the other. Each has a significant bearing on society and an impact on the knowledge that 
emerges. However, being aware of these two derivatives is significant to understand the 
scientific paradigm we currently exist in; if science is simply the collection of knowledge 
through logical and systematic collection, this is open to all peoples. If science requires 
accuracy, replicability and rigorous testing, the pool of people able to conduct it is far more 
limited. For example, in the psychological sciences, it is often the case that laboratory studies 
are considered the 'gold standard’ of empirical testing. These require a venue to control for 
confounding variables, expensive equipment for accuracy, and access to an incentivised 
population, as well access to journal articles from reliable sources which must often be paid 
for to access. The easiest way to gain access to all these things is through university (which 
by proxy involves being educated under the current paradigm) or through funding bids. Even 
those employed at universities continue to be bound to national agenda, as there is a pressure 
for researchers to produce socially significant or financially significant research in order to 
maintain their own position and value in the university.  
 
  While this is not necessarily negative in essence, this system narrows the scope of 
knowledge collection undertaken, with research focused primarily around practical outcomes. 
This situation has only deepened since the educational policy in the UK has shifted to 
establish Universities as business institutions rather than free-access educational 
establishments. Another alternate route for acquiring funding for knowledge collection is 
research grants, which also approach science from the same angle. Proposals to the ESRC 
(Economic and Social Research Council) in the UK, for example, must also include a section 
where any costings are justified and a quick glance at the opportunities for funding (diabetes, 
healthy aging, societal transformation and climate change) still show a distinctly practical 
slant. Therefore, this variation of science quickly ends up in a situation where it is almost 
inherently bound to state-interest, and it becomes the case where this is the only form of 
knowledge collection that is considered viable or worthwhile for society.  
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   This is not to advocate the abandonment of current scientific practises in favour of 
Wissenschaft. However, it is a warning against a society and scientific community building 
its ideas of prestige and truth purely on the back of empiricism and what is practically 
beneficial. A full adoption of 'Wissenschaft' with the same status as current 'science' would 
not be without its issues either, as the current dominant paradigm limits those who collect and 
produce statements of knowledge to those with at least a university level education and 
reduces ‘noise’. The scientific community is therefore safeguarded from simply anything 
being classed as 'knowledge' and anyone being classed as a 'scientist'. The means to produce 
and collect knowledge remain restricted but the cost, particularly in terms of the breadth of 
knowledge explored, remains a significant one.  
 
   The relevance of this in terms of the current paper is as follows; the reconsideration of 
Jung, this paper, and the current scientific community, do not exist in a void. If Jung’s ideas 
and framing are considered wholly unscientific instead of simply emerging from a different 
branch of science, then there would be no use in pursuing these ideas in modern psychology 
nor continuing to explore them within this work. These dual definitions have led to a split in 
the Jungian community, with a considerable amount of practitioners who maintain that 
science as it is, is irrelevant for Jungian practise (Jones, 2014). This is an understandable 
view from those who subscribe to a more 'Wissenschaft' angled perspective, versus 'science' 
as the only way 'to know'. There are many theoretical aspects of the collective unconscious 
which could not yet be adequately captured by empiricism and quantification and given much 
of the foundation being based in the experiential, there is reasonable concern for the theory 
not being done justice by modern empirical psychology. Equally, there exists a counter 
community who appear to search for anything Jungian in the empirical sciences and laud it as 
evidence that Jung is indeed 'scientific' in order to gain validation for the theory (Saban, 
2014). However, like Saban (2014) it is the belief of the writer that this divide must be healed 
and the Jungian community itself must individuate and come to accept its contraries. The 
empiricists must accept the abstract, and the abstract the elements of the empirical, as 
opposites and equals. Much like in Goethe's concept of science, both must be used in order to 
capture the true nature of the thing, as neither alone will do the theory (or more importantly, 
the phenomenon) full justice.  
 
  Crucially, the reality is that the terms and standards that will be used (and already have been 
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used) to critique Jung are largely borne from the science of the Enlightenment era, which is 
largely positivistic and physical (i.e. emergent from a science which relies on sensory input as 
the only way ‘to know’, at the exclusion of the subjective element). This paradigm continues 
to be useful, but primarily to study the biological and empirical side of the collective 
unconscious, which Jung (1948/1977) believed to be the proper concern of “scientific 
psychology” (p.518, CW 18. para 1228), by which I believe he meant empirical psychology. 
Additionally, since this is the dominant paradigm, whether the collective unconscious can be 
reframed as a scientific concept (i.e. amenable to empirical study) without losing the 
experiential aspect of its roots remains critically important to its continued relevance in 
modern Psychology. Whether this is a reflection of it being 'truthful' or 'meaningful' is largely 
irrelevant; we cannot extricate the theory of the collective unconscious from its socio-
political background and we cannot blindly and stubbornly ignore what bearing this will have 
on the theory's future; the impact of history is very much real and we see it traced clearly 
through the last 400 years of scientific progress. If the theory cannot be reframed and 
understood on modern terms, with empirical backing, then it will fall by the wayside and 
remain a quirky side-note in the history of Psychology rather than being recognised as a first 
attempt at exploring a complex and highly relevant phenomenon.  
 
Addressing Unresolved Methodological Issues 
       That a phenomenon can be both subjective and objective is a position which makes 
clearer Jung’s perspective on the ontology of the archetypes. The dual definitions outlined 
above ease the apparent contentions in Jung’s work and highlight two potential methods of 
study for the collective unconscious – an approach which utilises the scientific method, and 
an approach which is systematic and logical, but not necessarily centered around the 
observable and empiricism. The latter is becoming increasingly common in the qualitative 
methods in Psychology, and also includes space for reflection on the interaction between the 
self and the interpretations provided. This fits very neatly with the underlying ethos of the 
psychoanalytic approach, as it again returns to ideas of facere, wherein researchers 
acknowledge and reflect on their positions as the interpreters and ‘makers’ of facts, and the 
recognises that the conscious and unconscious interplay between observer and phenomenon 
is a dynamic within itself, thereby bringing the humanistic element back into scientific 
enquiry. Thus, in combination (as in a mixed-methods approach), it seems to provide a 
potential pathway to establishing a more active and harmonious field for the study of the 
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archetypes.  
 
   However, even knowing about the two scientific derivatives (Wissenchaft and modern 
science) above, there remain some methodological issues in terms of whether the archetypes 
should be treated as absolute or relative phenomena. Jung’s (1948/1977) position on this 
appears to be mixed, for example, he suggested that only the “biological [aspect], is the 
proper concern of scientific psychology” (p.518, CW 18. para 1228) but also clearly draws on 
German Romantic ideals of science himself, and stated that “purely intellectualistic, 
analytical, atomistic and mechanistic thinking has, in my opinion, landed us in a cul-de-sac, 
since analysis also requires synthesis and intuition” (1928/1993, pg. 39) The former statement 
suggests a call for a focus on a more enduring truth which is unchanging over time (i.e. an 
absolute), while the latter indicates the importance of interpretation on the part of the 
researcher, which may indicate an orientation towards a more flexible and relative truth.  
 
   This is not necessarily a flaw of character or indicative of the theory being irreconcilable 
with modern science, but at least partially reflective of what was, at the time, psychology as a 
science with a largely divided identity - an issue which it still suffers from today. Different 
branches of psychology continue to hold varying (and frequently opposing or contradictory) 
epistemological and ontological beliefs, as well as philosophical foundations, e.g. the 
discursive psychologists see reality as something that is made through speech, while strict 
empiricists might see reality as something that is ‘out there’, fixed and unchangeable by 
subjective means. As a note on this thought: the words "reality" and "truth" are often used 
interchangeably, yet we accept that reality is something that is changeable based on historical 
or emotional events. Meanwhile, truth is considered fixed and unmoving. This creates a 
peculiar divide wherein reality is not truth, and truth is not reality, although we mean both to 
be something which is ‘actual’; that is to say, it may be more apt to suggest that there are 
relative and absolute phenomena, which each need their own distinct approach. Psychology 
(and the theory of the archetypes in particular) sits at the crux of this tension between 
relativist and positivist truth and continues to struggle in finding its place among the sciences 
methodologically as a result, being a curious blend of the methods of the natural and social 
sciences. Jung lived while this tension was still very much emergent, and it is this conflict 
which shapes the apparent contradictions surrounding the ontology of the archetypes and 
collective unconscious.  
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  Accordingly, in the writer’s opinion, the archetypes are neither biological nor experiential, 
nor can they strictly be classed a relativist or absolute phenomenon. They are both; with the 
archetypal patterns appearing invariably as an absolute phenomenon (unchanged by time or 
circumstance), and the transformations they manifest as appear relativist (influenced by the 
historical epoch, perception, culture, aesthetic values etc). Crucially, they are thus much like 
the flowers that botanist Humboldt (1793, cited in Cambray 2014) observed during his 
expeditions; “[they] should not be studied in isolation, but as an integral part of the 
environment in which they are found” (p.14). This requires us to study the context they arise 
from (supra-individual; experiential) and neurobiology (individual; material) and how these 
come together to produce the emergent subjective experience, or ‘qualia’ (individual; 
experiential). A full exploration of the archetype phenomenon must account for all three in 
order to capture the ‘true nature’ of the archetypes and their transformations and requires 
relativistic and absolute approaches to truth.  
 The Modern Relevance of the Archetypes 
 
  If it can be supported with empirical evidence to complement what already exists in 
experiential and cultural explorations, the very act of appropriately revising Jung’s theory of 
the archetypes would offer a valuable model for how the empirical and experiential 
approaches within psychology might be reconciled to approach a single theory. 
 
    The methodology and philosophy underlying neurophenomenology may be well-suited to 
this task, as it opens an avenue to study both the qualia and the biology in tandem, and to 
study the empirical aspects of experience while not reducing them to biology alone. This 
method was developed by Varela in the mid-1990s (Gordon, 2015) as an attempt to tackle the 
dualist paradigm that had emerged as a result of the mind-body split (Guendelman, 2017), 
and as an attempt to tackle the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. how can neuronal activity 
produce subjective experience? (Chalmers, 1995; 2007). Varela (1996) suggests that the only 
way to overcome this is by studying the structure of human experience itself. The approach 
places great importance on the irreducibility of conscious experience, and seeks to find 
structure in phenomenological accounts, and to link these to their cognitive counterparts 
(Varela, 1996). This methodology has produced fruitful results, as in the case of the research 
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by Petitmengen, Navaro and Levanquyen (2007) which combined studies of the conscious 
experience of epileptic patients with neuroscientific methods. The experiential studies 
conducted acted to guide the EEG procedures and led to the finding that cerebral activity had 
undergone subtle change hours before the seizure. As well as the advancements in 
understanding epilepsy, the results of this study have opened the doors for possible 
therapeutic interventions for sufferers prior to seizure. This is an extremely a promising result 
for a relatively new methodology, and indicative of the potential of neurophenomenology.  
 
   However, as it is, neurophenomenology does not allow for the harmonious convergence of 
context alongside qualia and biology, which may well be better approached through 
anthropological methods such as ethnology. For example, if one were to explore the symbol 
for death in a specific culture, cultural studies would may need to be conducted to explore 
how this may influence the archetypal expression, as well as work with the individual’s 
experience and underlying neurology. Additionally, neurophenomenology has yet to be 
popularised in modern psychology; there is still more work to be done to make this 
methodology clear and accessible to the typical researcher, making it hard to ensure scientific 
rigor and reliability at present. In the case of the archetypes, since any neural research would 
still be exploratory, it is also likely that (issues with identifying archetypal experience aside) 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research would be the most promising place 
to begin this kind of research in order to take advantage of their spatial accuracy. By contrast, 
the electroencephalogram (EEG) provides exceptional temporal accuracy (Cohen, 2011) but 
is not the best approach for precise location or investigating deep brain areas (Cohen, 2014), 
and without much prior research to identify the areas involved in archetypal experience, we 
cannot guarantee that we would not expect to see deep brain areas involved. It would also be 
incredibly difficult to find event-related-potentials (ERPs), and even for time series data, 
there is no current research to give us an idea of what the time course of an archetypal 
experience would be. Without a clear idea of this, the temporal precision actually acts as a 
disadvantage, as an uncertain time course renders the analyses unreliable (Cohen, 2014). This 
essentially makes EEG largely suboptimal for this investigation. The issue with the alternate, 
fMRI, is that it is currently extremely expensive and thus not accessible to all researchers, 
and so neurophenomenology’s use for more exploratory research (as would be the case with 
the archetypes) is somewhat limited by these practical factors.  
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    However, practically speaking, if an appropriate empirical approach to Jung’s work could 
be found, this would also provide a useful tool for self-development, clinical work, and even 
for understanding the underlying tensions in religious conflicts. The last of these may seem a 
rather sudden departure from the former two which are arguably self-evident, but the 
theorised presence of archetypes in religion, and their relevance to socio-political conflict is 
not to be underestimated. This is particularly relevant today, as Huntington’s (1993) Clash of 
Civilisations hypothesis (which suggested that post-cold-war conflict would centre around 
religious and cultural identity), appears to have come to fruition over the last twenty years 
with religion emerging again, above ideology, as a major source of intergroup conflict 
(Kashima 2016, cited in Saroglou, 2016). As Jung suggests that the primary form of 
archetypal expression is religious belief systems (1964), it is plausible that a broader adoption 
of Jungian ideas would provide the psychological community with new insights into religious 
conflict and potentially new methodologies to counteract them. This is a global issue, and 
certainly the business of social psychologists. It should also be noted, for example, that 
religiosity has been suggested as a lesser determinant of religious prejudice than traits such as 
authoritarianism (Saruglou, 2016), and while this intersection may be beyond the ken of 
contemporary theology or political studies, it is not beyond Psychology. A theory like that of 
the collective unconscious and the archetypes, which can grapple with intergroup conflict, 
religion and individual personality tensions, would thus have much to offer the modern world 
- but only if it can be shown to have foundations in material reality. 
 
   The current state of affairs is that the theory (despite lack of empirical evidence), is still 
used to understand individual cases, and there exist associations which offer therapy and 
training in Jungian practises. For example, the British Jungian Analytic Association offers 
four year courses in Jungian psychotherapy, an MSc and various training sessions. A glance 
at recent publications shows that Jungian theory is used to understand everything from 
organisational practises (Moxnes & Moxnes, 2016) to Indian music and alchemy (Singh, 
2013). This may raise the question of why it is necessary to begin testing the very 
foundations of the theory if it is already in popular use in certain circles. 
 
  However, as already discussed, Jungian theory is still largely divorced from modern 
psychology and very few psychologists take the theory seriously – and with good reason. The 
theory lacks clear scientific foundations and efforts to unite it and modify it in accordance 
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with modern research have been few. The theory is often written off as needlessly esoteric 
(thereby making itself deliberately obtuse and hard to debate) or pseudoscience. This is not a 
promising progression for a supposedly scientific theory, which ought to be clear, accessible 
and falsifiable.  
 
   There is an additional importance for continued study in this field. If the theory is found to 
lack solid empirical evidence, by the current study and by future studies, then it raises the 
question of ethical implications for the practises outlined above. After all, scientific 
qualifications should not be offered in a subject which is not scientific and it is, arguably, 
unethical to provide psychological advice based on a theory which cannot be scientifically 
validated.  
 
    Finally, on this note, while the primary purpose of this thesis is to discuss whether the 
collective unconscious can be reformulated to be amenable to scientific practises, I would 
like to highlight that this is not a value judgement; as Popper (1963/1998) himself states 
when discussing his own demarcation criteria for scientific practise, this is not an assertion 
regarding meaningfulness, significance, truth or acceptability. It is simply a determination of 
whether this theory and the research stemming from it is scientific. The following chapter 
will therefore further discuss mainstream scientific practises, what we have come to regard as 
scientific honesty, and how the collective unconscious can (and cannot) fit within the current 
scientific paradigm. 
Breaking Down the Collective Unconscious.  
 
   Before beginning to assess whether the theory of the archetypes is amenable to empirical 
investigation, it is first necessary to be able to understand the theory plainly in order to make 
it accessible; one of the first obstacles in understanding Jung’s theory of the collective 
unconscious is the sheer number of sub-ideas that seem to exist within the core concept. 
Thus, in the interest of clarity, the core idea along with the most relevant intricacies are listed 
below.  
 
1st [Core]: All individuals are capable of engaging in recurrent patterns of thought and 
behaviour, identifiable in other times or cultures. 
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2nd : That the recurrent patterns are due to a substratum of the unconscious, known as the 
collective unconscious. Unlike the personal unconscious, the collective unconscious is an 
inherited structure bearing much resemblance to the biological instincts.  
 
3rd : That these recurrent patterns of thought and behaviour (often manifesting as spontaneous 
images, known as symbols) can be broken down into distinct archetypes, recognisable by the 
function they serve rather than by the image they appear as. 
 
4th : That the type of thought forms and symbols that arise from this structure have some 
relationship to the psychological state of the individual and are functionally significant.  
 
5th : That the archetypal symbols which arise are indicative of the hidden or repressed 
personality traits of the individual.  
 
6th : That there is a part of the mind which seeks to strike a balance between the conscious 
and unconscious elements, referred to as ‘The Self’.  
 
7th : Failure to strike a balance between the archetypes or having poor or over-zealous 
relationships with the archetypes, leads to the development of complexes.  
 
The core idea will be analysed in order to establish the fundamental issues with reconciling 
the theory of the archetypes with modern science, with occasional reference to sub-ideas 2 
and 3; if this core foundation is not amenable to scientific practise, it is also unlikely that it 
would be possible to falsify those ideas which are contingent upon it. The bulk of the idea 
that will be discussed throughout the rest of the paper is summarised below, with bolded 
statements representing particular areas of interest.  
 
‘That there are recurrent patterns of thought and behaviour which arise from a source 
outside of the individual’s own life experiences. The recurrent patterns are due to a 
substratum of the unconscious, known as the collective unconscious. Unlike the personal 
unconscious, the collective unconscious is an inherited structure bearing much resemblance 
to the biological instincts. The symbols that arise from this subconscious structure 
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(transformations) are recognisable by the function they serve rather than by the image they 
appear as, i.e. the Hero could be anything from Hercules to Harry Potter to an admirable 
friend.' 
 
Empirical Science and its Demarcation Criteria 
 
   My aim is to use the statement above and to test it against the standards of modern 
scientific practise. This is in order to establish (1) where the original theory failed in meeting 
these standards, (2) where it can meet these standards at present with the aid of modern 
research, and (3) which elements of the theory continue to be outside the scope of empiricism 
today. To do this effectively, it is important to be absolutely clear on what the standards are 
for modern scientific practise. Pinning down what it is that makes a theory or practise 
scientific or pseudoscientific is no easy task, but it is a necessary one in order to attempt to 
discern which elements of the collective unconscious are amenable to scientific study in the 
current Anglo-American tradition (i.e. following the Anglo-French tradition earlier outlined, 
but which, in psychology, is now also largely championed by American Psychological 
Association). 
  
    Previous notable attempts at demarcation between good and bad scientific practise can be 
found in the work of Popper (1963/1998), Kuhn (1970/1998) and Lakatos (1973/1998). 
Throughout these works, the most typical example used for the sake of contrast to ‘true 
science’ is Astrology. This is because, although now widely recognised as a pseudoscientific 
practise, Astrology too once enjoyed some scientific credibility. Astrology is therefore set up 
as an example to illustrate what is seen as a mistake that was once made in the demarcation 
between science and pseudoscience, and which therefore provides a relatively uncontentious 
marker along the borderline between the two poles. The work of Popper (1963/1998), Kuhn 
(1970/1998) and Lakatos (1973/1998) all endeavour to explore this borderline and establish 
exact limits to avoid this mistake (of false knowledge being presented as science) being made 
in future scientific endeavours. In doing so, they attempt to set the standards for good 
scientific practise and elaborate on the expectations of the Anglo-American tradition, which 
we would hope would provide stable foundations for seeing where Jung’s original theory did 
not meet hard scientific standards. The criteria posited by these scholars will now be 
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discussed with occasional reference to the Astrological comparisons made in the original 
texts.  
Falsification 
   Popper (1963/1998) states that science and pseudoscience are differentiated by their use of 
the empirical method, and that true science arises from ‘observation or experiment’. He 
criticises psychoanalysis on the basis of it having apparent explanatory power, but only 
seeming to accept verifications rather than refutations of the theory. He sets this up against 
Einstein’s gravitational theory, and explores how in this case, as in many cases in the 
physical sciences, the theory is ‘incompatible with certain results of observation’. This is 
known as falsification.  
 
   One of the adopted cornerstones of empirical science has long been the idea of falsification, 
which was Popper’s (1963) suggested primary means for differentiating scientific from non-
scientific practises. Falsification is the idea that a theory must have a set of conditions against 
which it can be tested and contradicted by a basic observational statement. This was 
suggested on the basis that we cannot confirm theories through observation, as a discrepant 
observation may always potentially occur. The most typical illustration of this stems from the 
‘all swans are white’ example. The concept underlying this is that the statement could never 
be proven true as the evidence would have to be infinite (all swans in the world, from past, 
present and future) and attempting to gather this information would be unfeasible and leads to 
the problem of induction i.e., we cannot achieve firm knowledge when there is always the 
potential for contradictory evidence (Henderson, 2019). However, the all-statement can be 
rejected with one singular observation, e.g. of a single black swan. The observation of a 
single black swan shows that the initial statement is false as it is not a universal law, allowing 
it to be dismissed.  
 
   However, Kuhn (1970/1998) and Lakatos (1973/1998) criticise the idea that a theory should 
be dismissed and overthrown in the presence of contradictory evidence, indicating that many 
notable scientific theories such as Einstein’s Relativity theory and Newtonian theory were 
resistant to refutation and dismissal, instead generating saving hypotheses or altering 
auxiliary hypotheses. It is also suggested that this is not a bad thing; in a theory’s initial 
conceptualisation, inaccuracies and refining adjustments are an inevitability. To elaborate on 
the textbook example given above, the true answer is not that there are no white swans, for 
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example; it is far more nuanced than that. The answer is that black swans are far less common 
than white swans, that they are native to Australia and New Zealand (RSPB, 2007), and that 
there exist approximately 37 breeding pairs in the UK (McCarthy, 2012). Why is this 
relevant? Because the theory of ‘all swans are white’ had to be retained but moderated and 
tested in greater detail, including in a study of over 20 million birds (British Trust for 
Ornithology 2012, cited in McCarthy 2012), and has also been found to be dependent on 
variables such as geographical location. It is therefore not sufficient to say a single 
falsification alone is enough to dismiss an entire theory; ‘all swans are white’, when further 
tested, simply becomes ‘most swans are white – with a number of conditions.’ Therefore, 
while the initial statement is therefore false, it would not be correct to dismiss the theory 
entirely either, as its initial suggestion is still close to the truth and the observation was based 
in a reality - that most swans are white. And the same is often true and the mentality of 
‘adjustment, not overthrow’ applied within psychological theory, as further explored by Kuhn 
(1970/1998).  
 
    Kuhn’s (1970/1998) criticism of the emphasis on falsification arises from the fact that 
instances of theory overthrow (following testing) only occur when a field is already in crisis, 
and when there is a better alternative explanation for the exponents of the past theory to shift 
to. In support of this, Kuhn (1970/1998) highlights the way that commonly accepted theories 
may be tested, but if the evidence is unfavourable, it is often the practitioner that is blamed 
for failure to support it. Only after repeated failure does opinion begin to shift. These 
arguments, if accepted, indicate that falsification alone is not sufficient to distinguish a 
science from a non-science.  
 
   This said, generating theories with clear support and refutation conditions is a gesture of 
willingness to be disproved and a mark of scientific integrity; a hypothesis ought not to be a 
statement which one must dogmatically believe or disbelieve. Thus, while falsification alone 
may not be enough to singularly mark out a science from pseudoscience, it is surely an 
important factor to ensure good scientific practise.  
 
   It is therefore important to now ask the question ‘to what degree is the theory of the 
collective unconscious and the archetypes falsifiable?’.  
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Falsifiability of the Archetypes   
    1st [Core]: All individuals are capable of engaging in recurrent patterns of thought 
and behaviour, identifiable in other times or cultures. 
 
   On the surface, the core idea appears to pass this check. Firstly, with regards to whether or 
not the ‘true’ condition can be observed, as already explored in the introduction, there are 
indeed observable patterns which can be identified across different times and cultures, such 
as the idea of the Mother (expressed as Earth Mother, Demeter, Virgin Mary, etc), the idea of 
the Shadow (expressed as Demons, Jinn, Asura/Rakshasa, etc), the idea of the Hero 
(expressed as Hercules, Joan of Arc, Ivan Tsarevich etc). As for establishing a false 
condition, we are also working with an ‘all’ condition which initially looks promising. 
Looking at old collective data (i.e. mythology) is little different to archival research. 
Accordingly, if we were to examine a society with largely the same living conditions as the 
others, but which did not produce archetypal ideas of any description (e.g. Jester, Shadow, 
Anima etc) then this would be counter-evidence for the theory of the archetypes, and the 
theory would indeed either need to be modified or discarded. If there are no identifiable 
patterns in the same manner as those that exist in other cultures, or if there exists a person 
who does not engage in any of these patterns, then the theory can be falsified as this provides 
a theoretical ‘false’ condition. In this sense, the theory is indeed falsifiable - provided ‘true’ 
and ‘false’ conditions can actually be observed in practise. 
 
   It is arguable that there are some issues with these conditions. For example, that we are 
projecting these themes on ad hoc, and may be subject to confirmation bias. That said, the 
fact that it is possible to group many of these concepts together is indicative that they share 
enough abstract properties and functions (e.g. to save, to trick, to nurture, to be above, to be 
below, light, dark etc) to group them and see them as one ‘class’ of objects. Similarly, we 
may see that an animal has four legs, barks, wags its tail, and is typically between our ankle 
and hip height and call it a ‘dog’. Although the categorisation is ad hoc, we would also be 
correct to assume that all these animals had a similar ‘root’ or ancestry. Thus, while 
important to take into account, this in itself is not enough to rule out the validity of the 
observable similarity we can see in patterns of thought across culture, and there does seem to 
be an observable ‘true’ condition for the theory.  
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   A much more critical issue is the testability of the theory; in order to properly falsify a 
theory, you must be able to test it, and clearly identify results which run counter to the 
hypothesis. For the archetypes, this is where the issues arise. Although we can theoretically 
say that ‘all people can produce repeated patterns, and this can be evidenced’, the original 
concept lacks conditions that are specified clearly enough to allow testing for counter 
evidence. To be able to actually observe a ‘false’ condition, an experimenter must first have 
some kind of stimuli to elicit the desired response. This would require a list or description of 
necessary stimuli which have elicited the behaviour in previous observations. Secondly, the 
experimenter would need a hard definition of observable outcomes so that they can 
differentiate an archetypal response from a non-archetypal response. There are multiple ways 
that this could be achieved. For example, a full list of archetypes and their potential 
transformations as they would appear in verbal behaviour could be provided (if the researcher 
is taking a more quantitative approach), or if they are taking a more materialistic approach, it 
would be important to have a list of brain areas or physiological responses that would be 
indicative of an archetypal response. This would allow the researcher to present the 
participant with a discrete stimulus and observe an outcome which is clearly either archetypal 
or non-archetypal. This information would allow researchers to make a clear all-statement 
which could then be clearly disproven by a future negative statement, e.g. ‘all people will 
repeat ideas of the Mother, Shadow or Heroes in the presence of x stimuli’, or even ‘all 
people will repeat ideas of the Mother, Shadow or Heroes in the presence of x stimuli, if there 
is significant emotional impact containing these images in early development)’, or ‘all people 
will repeat ideas of the Mother, Shadow or Heroes in the presence of x stimuli, regardless of 
their early development’. The clear delimiting of which patterns we ought to see would allow 
us to look retrospectively through history and to mark a dividing line between ideas that will 
be repeated and prospectively to understand those that will not. This specificity would be 
essential in order for us to make a prediction and posit a hypothesis which can be supported 
(or refuted) by alternate observations, i.e. falsified. 
 
    This specificity is not provided in the original theory; what Jung (1936/37/1975) instead 
suggests is that “there are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life” (p. 48, 
CW 9 pt. 1, para 99), and that they cannot be studied directly but only through the secondary 
phenomenon, which themselves are of “infinite variety” (Jung, 1954a/1975, p.81, CW 9 pt.1, 
para 156). This makes the concept difficult if not impossible to define in practise; if a church 
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can be a manifestation of the mother archetype, who is to say a pen, being vaguely phallic, is 
not a product of the Animus? That a cup, being a container, is not somehow a product of the 
Mother archetype, or the Anima? What a researcher is instead left with is a sliding spectrum 
of things that are ‘more or less’ archetypal rather than things that strictly are not. It is possible 
to make some inferences from the qualitative accounts, e.g. experiences of the archetype are 
associated with profound psychological impact and feelings of numinosity (Jung, 1956/1977), 
so we may presume that a Mother archetype will be more present in the Virgin Mary than in a 
cup. However, there is no reason to be found in Jung’s work that a cup, too, could not 
represent the Mother archetype under the right circumstances. Particularly if that cup is 
warm, and if the edges of the cup are rounded, if the individual drinks from the cup and fills 
their mouth with liquid that will sustain them for days to come or protect them from harm. 
The form itself, the physical manifestation or observable phenomenon, is treated as irrelevant 
provided the core function and set of underlying attributes is met, as outlined in the 3rd core 
idea, i.e.  
 
3rd : That these recurrent patterns of thought and behaviour (often manifesting as 
spontaneous images, known as symbols) can be broken down into distinct archetypes, 
recognisable by the function they serve rather than by the image they appear as. 
 
 Therefore, any observable outcome could be observed and interpreted as providing support 
for the theory, which would clearly be pseudoscientific if this testing approach were to be 
adopted. It is difficult to build a nomothetic law (or even establish a control group) upon the 
back of what appears to be personal associations, as the basic statement for contradiction 
becomes contingent on individual differences. Thus, Jung’s unwillingness (or inherent 
inability due to the phenomena itself) to provide clear boundaries on what an archetype is, 
makes them extremely difficult to test and falsify. 
 
This causes clear issues for testability; not only does the stimuli have no precise definition, 
but the outcome lacks definition as well. With no clear delimiting (because the 
transformations are dependent on individual differences and thus more of a relative truth than 
an absolute one), the theory is essentially reducible to ‘unknown stimuli/infinitely variable 
stimuli causes unknown outcome/infinitely variable outcome’. This is an entirely unworkable 
state for any scientific theory and has ramifications for the testability of every other sub-
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theory that branches off it.  
 
  To illustrate this, to test this, we will discuss the potential testing of the 2nd core idea. 
 
2nd : That the recurrent patterns are due to a substratum of the unconscious, known as 
the collective unconscious. Unlike the personal unconscious, the collective 
unconscious is an inherited structure bearing much resemblance to the biological 
instincts.  
 
   This statement, outlined above, could be tested by observing whether or not a child who 
grows up without a mother would still develop ideas of the Mother archetype. If found to be 
true, this would perhaps indicate some kind of inherited underpinning as Jung initially 
suggested and provide support for the idea that the archetypes may work akin to biological 
instincts. In reality, this would be impossible to test because there is no clear list of 
observable outcomes which would indicate the presence of the mother archetype and no clear 
stimuli to test it. In addition, there are also ‘saves’ built into the theory even if a false 
condition was observable; e.g. a Jungian analyst might determine that there is no obvious 
material for the Mother archetype because it has been pushed into the unconscious. Despite 
the Jungian idea that this repression would cause an equal and opposite reaction, there is no 
irrefutable observation of what this would look like either, except a set of behaviours which 
may (or may not) be reflective of a mental preoccupation. What would be more useful here 
for clinicians or experimenters is a set of definitions for verbal behaviour e.g. number of 
mentions of a particular subject, or number of times topic is changed when specific subject is 
mentioned.  
 
   There are some areas where the prospects for falsification are more promising if the issues 
with the core statement could be overcome. For example, for statement 2 to be falsifiable, all 
instances of the archetype must stem from unconscious, rather than conscious processing or 
individual experience. To test this, instances of archetypal experience would need to be 
recorded, and the researcher would need to be able to determine that the basis of these 
patterns is not due to conscious or personal experiences. The basic counter-statement for this 
hypothesis would be that if these thoughts are conscious, or that if all ‘archetypal 
experiences’ are derived from personal experience, then there is no such thing as the 
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collective unconscious (because there would be no need for it, and its only function would be 
explained by already known structures). In this regard, this aspect is in line with Popper’s 
criteria for falsifiability, as there is a significant element of risk involved, and practically 
determining that processes are unconscious rather than conscious is arguably possible with 
modern technology. In essence, brain activity in the absence of observable behaviour or self-
report of experience to indicate consciousness, may suggest unconscious processes. 
 
  For example, a recent study into unconscious access to conceptual action and sound 
information explored unconscious priming effects (Trumpp, Traub and Kiefer, 2013). This 
study investigated the unconscious processes through topography and ERPs (event-related-
potentials) and suggested different underlying neural generators for conscious and 
unconscious responses to stimuli. It also demonstrated that activity in sensory-motor brain 
systems could occur unconsciously, without imagery (in Jungian terms, this might be 
considered akin to the archetype without transformation). This suggests that it may be 
possible to tell conscious from unconscious processes activation using ERPs and topography. 
Therefore, at least in theory, a person who presented with a transformation of an archetype 
should be unconsciously primed to further archetypal content, which could be observed to be 
unconscious or conscious by the differing electrical potentials that occur in the brain. There is 
plenty of other research on differentiation conscious and unconscious content through neural-
correlates, including tests of bistable visual phenomenon (where the stimuli is constant, but 
conscious perception fluctuates) such as the work on binocular rivalry by Clifford (2006) or 
the Necker cube, work by Dieter, Melnick & Tadin (2015).  
  
  In reference to the second core idea, determining whether the source of a pattern of 
behaviour or thought stems from an individual’s personal experience (as opposed to the 
collective unconscious) is again more difficult to achieve reliably. Self-report measures are 
perhaps the easiest way to achieve, this, but if the experience has been acquired 
subconsciously, then it would not appear on this measure. Another method to help limit the 
potential knowledge the participant already has, could be by working with younger children. 
Jung even suggests this as a way to examine the archetypes, particularly in children 3-5 years 
old (1936/37/1975). However, in practise this approach could face difficulties with the child’s 
articulation or focus, and even then, many ideas may be subconsciously borrowed from the 
child’s environment instead, e.g. movies or books.  
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Additionally, even if the archetypes do stem from an inherited structure, this could be 
difficult to demonstrate in children. For example, if the archetypes do exist, and if they 
worked akin to Chomsky’s theory of language (2013) (i.e. an innate, biological structure that 
develops reliably, like a limb), then there may be a structure that is inherent (i.e. the 
collective unconscious), but which is not observable until a certain age, e.g. when the child 
first begins to speak/when the child first produces symbolic content. For this process, there 
first needs to be sufficient environmental input to give the child the tools to express, and 
although this may theoretically be linked to an inherited structure, at this point it becomes 
impossible to discern the inherited aspect, as all that can be reproduced is what has been 
experienced, i.e. the transformation of the archetype. However, in Jung’s original work, it 
should be noted he often refers to the mind like a “museum” (1964, p.57), or as a form of 
evolutionary structure with traces left behind. This is the core basis for his idea of the 
archetypes, i.e. that archetypes are can arise through images which are not consciously 
acquired, and which are expressed particularly in dreams or fantasies. Thus, theoretically, 
even a child who does not watch movies or have access to stories (which may indeed be an 
accessible population at pre-school age, particularly in areas of poverty or simply in cultures 
which are less media driven) should be able to dream or fantasise with archetypal content. 
Since verbal behaviour is observable, this could be one potential way to falsify the theory that 
the archetypes stem from a collective as opposed to personal unconscious, although the core 
issue of what is and what is not example of an archetype arises again here, so in practise it 
would still be near impossible to discern a ‘true’ or ‘false’ condition.  
 
   However, even with this already tenuous basis there are issues of clarity. It is not defined 
whether it is only the origin of the archetypes at birth that stems from the collective 
unconscious or if each experience of the archetypes must also stem from that same 
unconscious, collective structure. For example, if a person is conscious of a hero archetype in 
a piece of literature or film, can they then truly experience the hero archetype or are they 
precluded from this purely because the process is now conscious? If an individual specifically 
sets out to create a piece of art or a myth relating to an archetype, would this process too only 
be a pale conscious imitation, and not elicit the same neurological response as an archetypal 
experience? After all, Jung claims: 
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No one can take a more or less rational thought, reached the logical conclusion by 
deliberate intent, and then give it “symbolic” form. No matter what fantastic trappings 
one may put upon an idea of this kind, it will still remain a sign, linked to the 
conscious thought behind it, nor similar hints at something yet unknown. (Jung, 1964, 
p.41).  
 
  However, in the case that it is only the original basis which is intended to be unconscious (as 
opposed to the cause for each experience of the archetype), then the entire method of testing 
could be different entirely. Jung’s theory remains vague and exploratory in this aspect, 
without committing fully to one or the other, leaving the route to testing unclear.  
 
  In its original form, the theory is not specific enough to be falsifiable. Although there often 
seem to be potential or theoretical routes for falsification (e.g. for possibly identifying 
unconscious elements), all roads to testability are effectively blocked by the issues outlined 
with the very core of the idea due to striking problems with clarity and an unwillingness or 
inability to define terms, as well as issues with falsifying the basis of the inherited and 
‘collective’ claims originally set out. Of course, this is not to entirely discredit the life’s work 
of Jung. There is a phenomenon that is observable, and which lacks explanation - a collection 
of repeated patterns that seem to transcend time and culture. The theory of the collective 
unconscious and the archetypes begins to explore this and has some valuable things to offer, 
but despite Jung’s intentions, the theory, in its original form, does not appear to be falsifiable 
and thus not amenable to scientific enquiry.  
 
Why Revise the Theory? : Alternate Demarcation Criteria 
    If the original theory is not falsifiable, why then is it worth re-examining? It is impossible 
to ignore the immense importance of falsifiability for testing, and for establishing a 
flourishing research programme. However, as was previously mentioned, falsification alone 
is not enough to mark out whether a theory is science or pseudoscience; there are other 
approaches to demarcation which may be useful for understanding the research culture 
around the phenomenon Jung originally set out to explain. By exploring these alternate 
criteria in a revision of the theory, we enable ourselves to expand within the realms of good 
scientific practise and, where possible, develop the theory in line with this criterion. This in 
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turn may produce a result which is more amenable to scientific enquiry and, as will be 
suggested, may actually bring us a step closer to falsifiability itself.  
 
    By contrast to Popper’s (1963/1998) interest in revolutionary theory overthrow, Kuhn 
(1970/1998) focuses on what he refers to as ‘normal science’ and problem solving, which is 
essentially the work done within a theory, taking the general premise for granted. By 
engaging with the puzzles which challenge the theory, the scientists in question slowly 
expand the theory’s explanatory power. Kuhn (1970/1998) argues that the issue that emerges 
in non-sciences, like Astrology, is that the puzzles remain unsolved for an extended period 
and are often placed outside of the researcher’s control and resultantly no attempt is made to 
refine tools or theory in order to increase its predictive power. The link between predictive 
power and scientific status of a theory is a simple one, which Ruse (1982/1998) underlines 
quite clearly; science is about establishing universal laws. Thus, the presence of unsolved 
puzzles for extended periods, or puzzles not being solved for reasons that are placed outside 
of the researcher’s control, are often indicative of pseudoscientific study. Therefore, 
concerted effort to resolve puzzles, and to bring factors set beyond researcher control back 
into the realm of the testable appears to be a reasonable mark of a progressive scientific 
programme. 
 
   Lakatos’ (1973/1998) criteria is similar to Kuhn’s, in some respects, as both centre around 
the idea of progress. However, in Lakatos’ case, the hallmark of science is that the theory 
progresses enough to predict novel facts and provide an explanation for phenomena which 
other theoretical approaches cannot. It is also stressed that refutation is not the mark of total 
failure; theories fail instead when they lag behind the facts. To illustrate this example, 
Lakatos (1973/1998) highlights the persistent failure of Marxism to predict future events 
predictions (i.e. that socialist societies would have no revolutions, or that the first socialist 
uprising would occur in the most industrially developed society), instead generating ad hoc 
explanations for political outcomes. However, no substantial alterations are made to the 
theory to account for these failures and the innumerable explanations for the failures make it 
too difficult to pin down exactly which part of the theory needs alteration in the first instance. 
Therefore, regardless of the significance or usefulness of the theory, the number of anomalies 
without reasonable adjustment to the theory make its persisted use untenable. As Ruse 
(1982/1998) highlighted, since science is focused on establishing universal laws, it does not 
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allow for breaks in these laws, thus, if the law were true, the theory could account for any 
outcome, anomalies included. Thus it is clearly important that any scientific theory should be 
able to make accurate predictions about reality; it is not the presence of refutations that 
indicate empirical failure, but the absence of predictive successes (Lakatos, 1973/1998).  
 
   From these three approaches (that of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos), there are a number of 
general principles which seem to define the sciences from the non-sciences, and suggest what 
allowances ought to be made for those theories that are in their early development. For 
example, a theory must produce a testable hypothesis. Regardless of whether or not it is 
refuted, the very act of doing so is a mark of scientific integrity and this act is the beginning 
of a process towards establishing a flourishing research program. If a theory is refuted, it 
need not be instantly abandoned. Instead, modifications can (and sometimes should) be made 
to the theory; these are research puzzles, and in this time, the scientist may take the general 
premise as true. There is the clarification point that researchers cannot be selective about the 
evidence which emerges. Finally, after a period time that is unspecified here, this theory must 
be able to produce novel predictions and provide explanatory power that other competing 
theories cannot. If it cannot do so and the puzzles remain for a long time, it may be noted that 
the research program is stagnating. At this point, changes are ordinarily made or else the 
theory begins to go into decline. At this point, it is still not unscientific to remain with the 
theory, as many scientific theories still face unsolved problems and the reformation of the 
research program is still an option. The point at which it becomes unscientific is when an 
alternate theory emerges which is more successful at explaining and predicting the 
phenomena in question, but the less successful theory is still retained by the community in 
favour of the one that is objectively more successful. The most profitable course of action at 
this point, if the researchers involved consider themselves to be scientists, is to shift into 
testing the new theory. It is this point in particular which Astrology failed upon, as the 
emergence of early psychology and personality theories and psychometrics (such as Jung’s 
MBTI test) provided fuller and more plausible explanations for personality development.  
 
   One notable (and successful) example following these research guidelines is Newton’s 
theory of Universal Gravitation; it was first published in 1687 and struggled to fully and 
satisfactorily explain action at a distance, which was not resolved until the addition of 
Einstein’s theory of General Relativity, published in 1920. This demonstrates the length of 
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time that a scientific theory can take to resolve internal puzzles, and to make predictions 
which provide a fully accurate model of reality. Despite there being certain research puzzles 
unsolved, continued effort was made within the research community to resolve it, with steps 
clearly taken to understand anomalies. The theory of the collective unconscious and the 
archetypes by contrast is therefore very much in its infancy, and despite current issues, there 
is no reason at present why there might not still be a successful research program developed 
if the issues with falsification can be resolved. As Lakatos (1973/1998) highlights, even in the 
presence of so many refutations, it is not unscientific to stick to a degenerative programme if 
steps are being made to try and make it empirically progressive. That is to say, even with the 
current issues of falsification, a programme of study around the archetypes can still be 
scientific – but only if researchers continue to try and resolve these problems. It is this 
category which the current thesis aims to be part of.  
  
  From this aggregate of the above approaches it would seem that the difference between 
science and non-science is not defined by the theory alone, or whether or not it is falsifiable, 
but the entirety of the research process surrounding it. It is also notable that the differentiation 
is context sensitive; a theory can be scientific at one time and non-scientific at another, which 
was the case for the once credible Astrology.  
 
   However, there is another particularly interesting criterion from Thagard (1978/1998) 
which incorporates some elements of the previously mentioned as well as adding its own 
contribution. It is a little more complex than those listed above, a tripartite matrix, which I 
feel necessitated the summary before this addition.  
 
   The three elements posited for examination are theory, community and historical context 
(Thagard, 1978/1998). The three elements will be divided below and the relevant areas of 
interest suggested by Thagard (1978/1998) will be outlined.  
 
Theory: According to Thagard, a theory is scientific if it is structured so that it may be 
falsified, if it can make predictions, if it has significant explanatory power and if there is an 
element of problem-solving involved in its development (see Kuhn’s ‘normal science’). 
Ideally, there should also be a clear, plausible mechanism by which the posited relationships 
are possible. However, this is not essential; as Thagard (1978/1998) highlighted, the links 
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between smoking and cancer are well-accepted although the physical means are not fully 
understood.  
 
Community: Scientific versus non-scientific communities are marked out by their agreement 
on the core principles of the theory and having a cohesive narrative about how to solve the 
problems the theory faces. The research community should also be involved in the 
explanation of anomalies and demonstrate an awareness of other emergent theories and lastly, 
the community ought to be actively involved in confirmation and refutation of their theory.  
 
Historical Context: Here, Thagard (1978/1998) draws on the work of Kuhn and sets up an 
additional two considerations: the theory’s ability to explain new facts and capacity to deal  
with anomalies, and whether or not alternative (and more successful) theories are available; 
contrary to Lakatos’ demarcation, the presence of long-standing unsolved problems are only 
an issue when there is a more viable alternative available.  
 
  This is a somewhat oversimplified overview, as there are arguments to suggest that it is not 
possible to determine pseudo-science from science. For example, the concept of 
epistemological anarchy posited by Feyerabend (1975) suggests that scientific process is not 
guided by rational thought but is instead a more chaotic process which ought not to be 
dogmatic and rigid. However, assuming all theory adoption and abandonment is a matter of 
mere chance and that progression of any kind is illusory is unhelpful in discerning what 
works and what does not in the ongoing attempts to attain truth and control in an otherwise 
admittedly chaotic world. It is better to work with an imperfect model, in this respect, than to 
proceed without one at all. Without some clear shift towards falsifiability, other routes to 
scientific enquiry are also barred; we cannot problem-solve as recommended by Kuhn 
because the problems cannot be put into clear, testable terms; we cannot make predictions as 
recommended by Lakatos because what we are predicting is unclear, and false outcomes are 
impossible to discern; and there can be no active research community with agreed upon 
principles as suggested by Thagard (1978/1998), because, again, the route to testing is barred. 
It is thus my opinion that in its original form, the theory is not amenable to scientific enquiry. 
In light of this, laid out below is the demarcation criteria which I intend to adhere to and 
which I believe should underpin further research of the archetypes. By following this 
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criterion, it should be possible to develop a variation of the theory which is amenable to 
modern scientific practises; without doing so, the field risks further degeneration. 
 
1) The theory must have some clear hypothesis/hypotheses and a null for each. 
 
2) The hypotheses must be clearly testable in a way that can be repeated and verified by 
other practitioners. If the hypotheses cannot be tested with current means, there ought 
to be a clear indication of how it could be tested, e.g. with the right technology.  
 
3) Researchers ought to be actively involved with testing to support or refute the theory.  
 
4) A theory must be falsifiable with observable ‘true’ and ‘false’ conditions with clearly 
defined terms. All evidence must be retained regardless of if it supports or refutes the 
theory. However, refutation is not necessarily failure; auxiliary hypotheses may be 
amended to account for the changes in an attempt at refinement of the theory.  
 
5) There ought to be an indication for the physical means for the link between the cause 
and effect relationship posited. While this is not crucial, the presence of a physical 
link will help to ground the theory in physical reality, which is much in line with the 
current scientific paradigm.  
 
6) The core principles of the theory should be largely agreed upon by the researchers 
involved in the research program.  
 
7) If there is no attempt to change the theory in light of counter-evidence, then the 
community ought to at least be engaged with explaining the anomalies. This may be 
in line with ‘normal science’, which does not necessarily have to dramatically 
challenge the given theory or paradigm.  
 
8) There ought to be evidence of the community examining other theories and 
explanations for the phenomenon which they are attempting to explain, and perhaps 
reconsidering their own theory in response to this. 
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9) After a grace period for refinement, a theory ought to be able to predict novel facts. If 
a more successful theory emerges which provides more explanatory and predictive 
power, and the current theory also faces unsolved problems for long periods with little 
progress, then it is unscientific to maintain this theory.  
 
From Then to Now: Our Criteria and the Theory of the Archetypes.  
 
Of course, much has changed in Psychology even since the time of Jung, and there are issues 
the original theory faced which are possible to overcome today. Before turning to modern 
research to begin revising the theory, it is of interest to compare the old to the new, and see to 
what extent the constraints of the past are still relevant to the archetypes.  
 
   It is notable that Jung himself acknowledges the dominant paradigm of his time and makes 
a certain critique of it that is relevant to the current discussion. Jung states that: 
 
the thesis runs as follows: we accept as valid anything that comes from outside and 
can be verified. The ideal instance is verification by experiment. The antithesis is: we  
accept as valid anything that comes from inside and cannot be verified. (1954a/1975, 
p.76, CW 9 pt.1, para. 149). 
 
 Jung goes on to call this position as “hopeless” and laments the triumph of Aristotelian 
reasoning (i.e. mathematical logic) and Greek empiricism over Plato (whose theory of Forms 
in Phaedo suggested that there is the ever-changing material world, grasped by the senses, 
and the inner world of concepts such as justice and beauty, which are real in themselves and 
reachable through thought alone). The quote appears to lament the exclusion of the 
introspective and metaphysical from scientific study. Indeed, this narrative may be 
considered quite damning for the archetypes; the outlined paradigm almost prohibits the 
study of intra-subjective material, which a study of the human psyche (and certainly that of 
the archetypes) is arguably incomplete without.  
 
  In terms of direct reports of the subjective experience, it may now be argued that we could 
produce interviews and deploy self-report measures, and correspondence between these could 
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be taken as verbal behaviour in response to an experience. However, it remains the case that 
that ‘from within’ is taken merely as a response rather than reflection of reality, as it is 
difficult to objectively verify that these accounts represent the experience itself (i.e. a verbal 
account of motherhood is not considered a representation of motherhood, but an account of 
the subjective experience of motherhood). As a result, ‘that from within’ is still not taken to 
be an accurate representation of reality as may have been Jung’s wish judging by his 
fondness of Platonism (Mills, 2012). 
 
  This said, the inaccessibility of the inner world has vastly changed since Jung’s time and 
consciousness is no longer in the ‘black box’ that it used to be; accordingly, the narrative has 
shifted somewhat, and ‘that which comes from inside’ is no longer considered wholly 
unverifiable from a biological standpoint. There are now a myriad of techniques available to 
study the brain and potential neural-correlates of consciousness, which range from positron 
emission tomography (PET scans) and computed axial tomography (CAT scans), to 
electroencephalograms (EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and diffusion 
tensor imaging (DTI). Studying the archetypes scientifically is now more plausible than 
before (provided the researcher accepts the premise that the brain and mind are related), and 
these possibilities will only continue to grow as technology advances. Additionally, as 
behaviourism has declined and humans are no longer seen as purely rational actors, 
systematic qualitative approaches have increased in popularity (such as discourse analysis, 
ethnographic research, focus groups, etc.), and are more often seen running in tandem with 
empirical methods; it is easier now than before to begin to connect qualitative experiences 
with their potential neurological underpinnings.  
 
  It is important to note here that some of the failings in meeting scientific standards belong 
not only to the archetypes but to the entire psychoanalytic practise of the past. These are 
highlighted by Bornstein (2001;2005), who remarks on the disconnect between 
psychoanalytic psychology and other modern research branches. In an earlier paper, 
Bornstein (2001) attributes the failures of the research programme to the following ‘seven 
deadly sins’: insularity, inaccuracy, indifference, irrelevance, inefficiency, indeterminacy, 
and insolence. The question thus arises of whether it is possible to overcome this issue in the 
modern research programme, as the rooting of the archetype theory in this field has therefore 
led to similar issues.  
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   However, as is highlighted by Popper (1963) and Thagard (1978), many theories have roots 
in the mythology and the occult, such as the role of alchemy in the development of chemistry; 
that does not prevent them being scientific today. This is not to say that psychoanalytic 
practise is mythic or occult, but simply to highlight that origins of a theory are irrelevant to 
the way they may be later transformed. Post-Jungians, for example, now have a mixture of 
biological, developmental and cultural adaptations of Jung’s original theory. At a glance, this 
seems to violate the need for a community to be cohesive and unified in their basic principles. 
However, the diversity present in post-Jungian explanations is not necessarily an indication 
of discord in the community; each of these should be treated as a competing and occasionally 
complementary research programs. Additionally, many ideas from the psychodynamic school 
of thought have been prematurely abandoned, discredited, or plagiarised (Bornstein, 2005). 
For example, the traditionally Freudian ‘ego’ has been rebranded as Baddeley’s (1992) 
‘central executive’. The re-emergence of these concepts, albeit under different names and in 
different branches of psychology, indicates their continued scientific relevance. The 
development of competing research programmes (despite testing issues) and the persistence 
of similar ideas from the psychodynamic school of thought indicates that it is possible to 
revise the theory in such a way that it may be possible to re-enter mainstream psychology, 
and to establish a more active research programme once more, despite its roots in a typically 
more insular field.  
 
   In its initial conception, Jung did not manage to present us with a theory that allows us to 
empirically examine the archetypes (even with the more modern qualitative approaches 
available to Psychology), there are important exploratory steps made and elements of 
plausibility in the explanation Jung describes. As in the all-white-swans example suggested 
earlier, there may be at least a grain of truth in the original theory, and parts of the puzzle 
which might be accounted for by Jung’s suggestions. The issue for the theory of the 
collective unconscious at present is that it fails the very first hurdle of being amenable to 
scientific enquiry – it does not appear falsifiable. Falsification may not be the sole divider, 
but it is necessary to enable the other pursuits which divide science from pseudoscience, 
which have been outlined above. We must be able to test the theory – and currently, this is 
what the theory of the collective unconscious and the archetypes is missing. There is an 
active community who are interested in engaging in normal science with Jungian theory, but 
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the path to testing is unclear, leading to disunited practitioners and theorists with conflicting 
narratives about what the archetypes are and how they can be tested. Even in modern papers, 
there are very few attempts to empirically explore the archetypes, which arguably is because 
there is no clear route to do so, and due to the disputes regarding ontology which have been 
explored above. 
 
  However, there are a few papers which have suggested revisions of the theory based on 
other modern findings, which may provide a path for falsifiability, but these provide no actual 
explanation of how this might work beyond a reference to the theories they draw on. The 
remainder of this paper will be dedicated to doing just this – outlining and exploring modern 
interpretations of the theory of the collective unconscious and the archetypes, and then using 
the ideas suggested by the modern Jungian community and alternate research communities to 
create a model of how the core phenomenon might occur. This will ideally account for 
culture, experience and biology. It is my hope that this would enable the Jungian community 
to engage in normal science, with a falsifiable theory which remains true to the core elements 
of its predecessor, and which does not reduce the archetypes to pure experience or pure 
biology, in accordance with my reading of Jung’s original wishes. 
Modern Conceptualisations of the Collective Unconscious and the Archetypes 
 
     To begin to approach this idea afresh, I am first going to strip the idea back to its very 
basics, and examine how, in light of modern psychology, this phenomenon could come to be. 
The phenomena we are looking at is, as has now been said many times, recurrent patterns of 
thought and behaviour typified in mythology, dreams and fantasy. In its original form, the 
theory of the archetypes was not able to address this issue scientifically. My aim is to utilise 
theory of post-Jungians such as Knox (2004) and Merchant (2009; 2016), combined with 
works in neuroaesthetics and the recent work of Lakoff (2015) to provide a testable 
alternative to the original theory, while remaining true to its basic foundation. The parts of 
the original theory that simply are not needed to explain the phenomenon will be discarded, 
as it does not make logical sense to retain the parts of the theory which are not somehow 
required to explain the behaviour that support the phenomenon, i.e. if variable A accounts for 
all the variance and outcomes, there is no need for a variable B.  
  
   The most useful and logical place to start this process is by looking at the major adaptations 
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of the theory since Jung’s original conception of the archetypes; they are no longer 
considered undoubtedly innate, even by Jungians. This is not to say it is an abandoned 
position, as evolutionary psychologists such as Stevens (2006) and Goodwyn (2012) uphold 
that there may yet be an evolutionary basis for the archetypes. However, researchers such as 
Knox (2004), Sotirova-Kohli, Rosen, Smith, Henderson and Reece (2011), and Merchant 
(2009;2016) contest this and suggest that the archetypes are developmental. In revising the 
theory, an initial position on this must be taken and supported by current scientific theory.  
 
   In the case of innate archetypes, we must entertain the possibility that there are mental 
instincts in the same way that there are physical, and that humans possess some core 
similarities in emotional displays. This may be considered something akin to a human 
condition which is unchanging over time and culture. Goodwyn (2012) suggests that this is 
plausible and that a core psyche may be due to a ‘genetic bottleneck’ 200,000 years ago 
which makes humans more similar to each other than is the case in other species. 
Contrariwise, in the case of developed archetypes, the possibility we need to entertain is that 
regardless of temporal and cultural changes, all humans have a shared experience which 
causes them to generate images (transformations) which stem from the same core archetypes 
or function.  
 
    The most salient theory which has emerged (and which both camps appear to entertain) in 
post-Jungian research is that archetypes are a kind of image schema (i.e. abstract mental 
representations of embodied experiences, arising from our interactions with the environment). 
Knox (2004) suggests that the archetypes are emergent cognitive structures, resulting from 
the individual’s interaction with the environment. The theory draws on Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1999) work on metaphor, which suggests that our physical interactions with the world are 
the primary determinant in the way that we come to visualise situations or concepts which are 
difficult to articulate. These can be visuospatial in nature, for example that happy is up and 
sad is down, or somatic, such as affection as warmth (Goodwyn, 2012). Echoes of this can be 
seen in tales of katabasis, a descent into the underworld to retrieve something lost. For 
example, in the Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh, the King suffers the death of his companion, 
Enkidu, and embarks on the journey down to find the secrets of eternal life, or in the Greek 
Orpheus wherein the hero attempts to steal back his wife Eurydice from Hades. It is grief and 
sadness of some kind that drives the protagonists down in each case, which appears to 
Jungian Archetypes: A Step Towards Scientific Enquiry - Kyah McDonald 
 
49 
 
support the idea that there is a shared association between spatial positions and emotions (sad 
is down). Lakoff (1997) highlights the usefulness of this; our metaphors become a vehicle for 
finding meaning in our own lives, a desire which is also relevant for understanding our 
biological evolution as thinking, remembering and dreaming organisms (Stevens, 2006). 
 
   Since these image schemas provide a reliable sensorimotor scaffolding for the world, as all 
individuals experience various environmental interactions with concepts such as ‘up’, 
‘down’, ‘out’ or ‘path’ through their own spatial navigation, Knox (2004) argues that this 
may be the basis for the archetypes. What we are seeing in the archetypes, therefore, is not 
necessarily a spiritual, archaic experience in the sense Jung originally intended, but a 
universal metaphor pattern produced by early psychological self-organisation processes, 
interplaying with physical laws. Further to this, Merchant (2009;2016) states that this basic 
template of understanding is produced when a person is pre-verbal, a time of extreme 
affectivity, and thus the experiences are encoded primarily with visual and affective 
associations (Sotirova-Kohli et al., 2011), which may in part explain the numinous 
experience that Jung describes as being associated with the archetypes (Jung, 1964) and their 
visual manifestations. 
 
   The divide between the developmental and evolutionary position is not a clear-cut 
dichotomy. It is more a case of arguing whether this developmental experience merely shapes 
the means of expression for the archetypes (the evolutionary position), or whether it is the 
entire archetypal basis. In the case of the former, the experience of the archetypes is due to 
evolutionary history and is still beyond the realm of individual experience (Goodwyn, 2012), 
while in the latter the archetypes may be reduced to the re-experiencing of pre-verbal 
memories and thus entirely belong to the personal unconscious (Merchant, 2016), which 
indicates that concepts of innatism should be abandoned (Knox 2004; Merchant 2009). This 
may be considered something like a hard or soft influence debate around the influence of 
early sensorimotor experience on archetypal phenomena. 
 
 If it is the case that archetypal experience is simply a universal metaphor, the question 
arises of why some metaphors tend to be expressed using the universal basis while others are 
not – for example, the idea of setting a baby down a river, appears in the Kanji for 
‘nagareru’, the Japanese tale of Izanagi and Izanami and the Christian tale of Moses being set 
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down the river (Sotirova-Kohli et al., 2011). The connotations of abandonment are prevalent 
in each. By contrast, many metaphors use specific cultural artifacts as their basis and are not 
translatable to other cultures, such as references to a ‘one way ticket to x’ or ‘pancaking’ to 
describe a flattening effect (Merakchi & Rogers, 2013), which indicates that not all 
metaphoric expression utilises a universal framework. Further work on this subject has been 
conducted by Kövecses (2005), who suggests that metaphors can vary based on region, style, 
subculture and individual. Where universality does exist, the explanatory power of the 
sensorimotor explanation is frequently limited to small visuospatial suggestions, such as 
‘sadness is down’ and while this explains elements of mythology such as the journey down in 
katabasis, it does not explain the reoccurrence of the overall tale or its interplay with the idea 
of the hero. 
 
   It should also be noted that this is only a partial explanation of Jung’s original theory; there 
is no mention of enantiodromia and no clear attempts to identify which archetypes are present 
in the case studies of the most recent developmental literature. The interplay between the 
different archetypes within the self is of critical importance in Jung’s work and since it is the 
attached emotionality and connection with affective states which give the archetypes their 
psychological significance, it is arguable that at present this theory lacks the explanatory 
power of its predecessor. 
 
   Despite these drawbacks, the theory that archetypes are rooted in metaphorical thought, 
(which in turn are based upon developmentally based image schemas) is a significant 
contribution to Jungian psychology, providing researchers with means to establish 
expectations of what we might see when observing the archetypes and may provide the 
groundwork for understanding the archetypes through neurobiology. Considering the 
fantasies, fairy-tales and myths that the recurrent ideas are visible in, it does seem plausible 
that this could be a metaphorical mapping of emotional experience; the primary questions 
that arise are ‘why are those particular metaphors universal?’ especially because many seem 
far more complex than usual linguistic metaphors, and also ‘how could that work in a way 
that fully accounts for the observations made in the original theory?’. 
 
 If the outlined theory is correct, then this could go some ways towards resolving the issue of 
defined outcomes which was discussed earlier, i.e. the brain areas activated during archetypal 
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experience ought to be largely akin to metaphor processing; as is pointed out by Goodwyn 
(2012), the archetypes (or rather, their transformations) act as metaphorical representations of 
lived experiences in the world, which is highly akin to image-schemas. Additionally, in 
Jung’s explorations of archetypes in dreams, he often explores how the transformations are 
used to express personal issues that are below the level of conscious awareness. For example, 
Jung (1964) suggested that those who attempt to live beyond or above their capacities often 
have dreams of flying or falling. This is non-literal, and Jung interprets this as a figurative 
representation of their situation, which is meant to act as a warning for the dreamer. Jung 
refers to this as the compensatory function of the archetypes. This is highly akin to metaphor 
processes, where the properties of the figurative situation are used to provide a fuller 
explanation of a literal scenario. As a result, we would expect to see similar brain processes 
involved as in that of a standard metaphor.  
 
    If they are not similar to these brain areas, then the archetype is not a type of metaphor and 
we would need to revise the underlying mechanisms of this phenomenon. If archetypes are 
reducible to universal metaphor alone, then this should be the only activity we see. However, 
if there is a difference between standard metaphor processing and the archetypes, then we 
may expect to see additional arousal or other brain areas involved with processing the 
archetypes in comparison to the neural correlates associated with metaphor (provided stimuli 
can be found to trigger archetypal experience). To test this, it is first necessary to explore to 
what extent theories around metaphor processing could explain the archetypes.  
Metaphor Processing 
   Although primarily studied as a linguistic device, metaphor has been increasingly studied 
by psychologists as a conceptual tool to represent situations we are yet to understand or find 
difficult to articulate (Ma & Liu, 2008). When utilising conceptual metaphor, we are 
figuratively comparing two different objects, using the connotations of one to explain the 
qualities of the other. Through this process, we are able to elucidate sensory and affective 
details of abstract concepts with ease, for example in a phrase like ‘the warmth of her love’, 
the target ‘love’ is linked with the source ‘warmth’, setting the narrative of ‘love as 
temperature’. This can be seen in other ‘love as temperature’ metaphors, such as ‘she was 
acting cold’ to describe a situation where love or care seems absent. This source-target 
domain mapping thus expands our capabilities to reason about abstract targets (Shutova, 
Teufel, Korhonen, 2013). It could be argued that this is merely a comparative likening of one 
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object to another, and there is some in-field debate over whether a metaphor is simply an 
abbreviated form for a simile, where again one object is likened to another. However, Searle 
(1979) highlights that metaphors made into similes are frequently less informative than the 
former. For example, one might say of a lover, ‘that person is a home to me’. Here, the 
meaning is quite clear; the person in question serves the function of a home, they may keep 
the speaker safe or bring them a sense of comfort. By contrast, saying ‘this person is like a 
home to me’ begs the question of ‘in what way?’. This suggests that the conceptual metaphor, 
while similar, is separate from the simile and serves a distinct psychological purpose of its 
own; recent psycholinguistic models suggest that beyond similarity, metaphor is a form of 
class-inclusion and is better understood as a categorisation process than superficial 
comparison (Shibata, Toyomura, Motoyama, Itoh, Kawabata and Abe, 2012).  
 
   Although the language domain is associated with the left-hemisphere, it is the right 
hemisphere which has been considered to have particular significance during metaphor 
processing (Schmidt and Seger, 2009; Zeev-wolf, Faust, Levkovitz, Harpaz and Goldstein, 
2015). The reason for this is thought to be because the left hemisphere produces a narrow 
semantic field of associations to support further processing (fine semantic processing) while 
the right hemisphere generates a larger (but weaker) field of associations which may only be 
peripherally associated with the initial stimuli (coarse semantic processing) (Beeman & 
Bowden, 2000). Since the language used in metaphor is figurative, broader associations need 
to be made in order to ascertain the meaning of the statement and as a result of this, increased 
right hemispheric activation is frequently seen in the processing of metaphors.  
 
   Consonant with this theory, patterns of lateralisation in language comprehension have been 
found to be reversed in schizophrenic patients, with higher right-hemispherical activation 
found during typical language processing. This has led to suggestions that schizophrenic 
patients are over-reliant on coarse semantic coding (right hemisphere) during initial exposure 
to stimuli, which can lead to loose association patterns (Zeev-wolf, Faust, Levkovitz, Harpaz 
and Goldstein, 2015). This has both positive and negative outcomes; schizophrenic patients 
are able to notice remote relations between words which neurotypical subjects may not be 
able to, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish between related and non-related items 
due to a failure to recruit the left hemisphere for fine semantic coding. 
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   Right-hemispheric preference has also been found in the processing of certain image-based 
alphabets, such as Kanji. Since Kanji is derived from mythology, this graphic language serves 
a symbolic purpose rather than simply phonetic; kana (hiragana and katakana) are by contrast 
phonetic and show left hemispheric preference during processing (Sotirova-Kohli, et al. 
2011). Thus it seems to be the case that it is not the image alone but the associative process 
required to understand it which gives rise to right-hemispheric preference. 
 
  The role of the right-hemisphere in metaphor processing has been further expanded on in 
recent research which indicates that familiarity is a key mediator in right-hemispherical 
involvement. Schmidt, Debuse and Seger (2007) suggest that it may not be the metaphor 
itself which gives rise to this processing, but any novel sentence containing a distant semantic 
association since this is in accordance with the lateralisation suggested by Beeman and 
Bowden (2000). Schmidt and Seger (2009) tested this further to assess the role of 
figurativeness and familiarity and found that metaphors (by contrast to literal sentences) 
recruited the right insular, left temporal pole and right inferior gyrus. Metaphors which were 
familiar showed activation in the right middle frontal gyrus whereas difficult metaphors 
showed activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus. Since this area is associated with response 
inhibition (Swick, Ashley and Turken, 2008), it might be suggested that the left inferior 
frontal gyrus is activated to prevent undesirable learning while assessing whether or not two 
items are related, though this is only speculative. Schmidt and Seger’s (2009) study also 
includes a table (see appendix) outlining previous studies on metaphor processing, including 
cases where no right-hemispherical activation was found. In these cases, the metaphors used 
are typically embedded in simple sentences and/or are conventional or familiar. This 
indicates that sentence complexity and familiarity are important determinants of right 
hemispherical activation, with novel and higher complexity metaphors being more likely to 
give recruit the coarse semantic coding of the right hemisphere. 
 
     The left inferior frontal gyrus also seems to play a role in metaphor processing (Rapp, 
Leube, Erb, Grodd and Kirscher, 2004; Kirscher, Leube, Erb, Grodd and Rapp, 2007; 
Stringaris, Medford, Giampietro, Brammer and David, 2007). This has been observed in 
schizophrenic patients, for whom metaphor processing is often faulty, leading to concrete or 
literal interpretations (Rapp et al., 2004)).  Kirscher et al. (2007) conducted a study 
comparing the fMRIs of a control group to a group suffering with Schizophrenia. The groups 
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were processing unfamiliar, non-salient metaphoric sentences compared to literal sentences. 
The results suggested that the patients demonstrated increased activation in the left inferior 
frontal gyrus (BA 45, an area thought to be associated with semantic inference processing 
(Rapp et al., 2004)) which was significantly negatively correlated with concretism. Although 
both groups experienced the increased activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus in the 
metaphor condition as opposed to the literal sentence condition, schizophrenic patients 
exhibited this roughly 3cm dorsal to the control group.  This displacement combined with the 
frequent loose associations in schizophrenia may tentatively be considered as support for the 
prior speculation that this area if used for the decision-making process in accepting relations 
between items in difficult metaphors. This has some support given that lesions to the left 
inferior frontal gyrus also lead subjects to perform significantly worse than control subjects 
on Go/No-go tasks which require greater inhibitory control (Swick, Ashley and Turken, 
2008). In addition, the control subjects also demonstrated higher activation than patients in 
the right posterior temporal cortex and the right middle/superior temporal gyri (associated 
with syntactic processing) while reading metaphors (Kirscher, et al. 2007). 
 
   Interestingly (in conjunction with the sensorimotor theory underpinning the study) the 
angular gyrus is also purportedly involved in metaphor processing (Bonner, Peelle, Cook and 
Grossman, 2013). This is notable because the angular gyrus in particular has been associated 
with sensorimotor cognition when participants are asked to imagine actions or the features of 
objects (Bonner et al. 2013) and is the most commonly activated region found in semantic 
memory studies (Binder, Desai, Graves and Conant, 2009). The angular gyrus is associated 
with sensory integration in the heteromodal cortex and is thought to give rise to higher order 
multisensory perception. In relation to metaphor and the angular gyrus, there is a study which 
involves two shapes, originally designed by Köhler (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2003) which 
is of particular interest. In the study, one of the shapes presented is jagged and sharp and the 
other soft and rounded. When asked which is the ‘kiki’ and which is the ‘bouba’, most people 
will respond that the soft and rounded shape is the bouba. Ramachandran and Hubbard 
(2003) suggest that this is due to the soft, rounded shape of the lips involved with the auditory 
input of ‘bouba’ resembles the soft roundness of the shape in contrast to the sharper ‘kiki’. It 
is then suggested that that the connection between these abstract properties is made due to 
them creating similar waveforms which meet in the angular gyrus. Ramachandran and 
Hubbard (2003) also point out that the ‘kiki’ and ‘bouba’ effect does not work on those who 
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sustain damage to the angular gyrus, indicating that this may be the area responsible for our 
ability to process abstract properties and thus a key area for metaphorical processing. 
 
   In the case of the archetypes, since it is frequently suggested that the experience of this 
phenomena feels as if it comes from outside the self (Goodwyn, 2012), we might presume 
that the metaphor would be classed as complex or at least unfamiliar and would thus recruit 
the right-hemisphere and the left inferior frontal gyrus. We would also expect to see the 
angular gyrus activated in the process of recalling vivid sensory experiences. In cases where 
the symbols appear to derive from the personal unconscious, we may expect less right 
hemispheric activation, or potentially none at all because the individual would be drawing on 
existing memories rather than drawing on creative faculties to create a novel symbol. This 
may also require less interpretation and cross-sensory integration than novel metaphor 
generation. 
 
  This theory goes some way towards solving one of the main issues of the original theory of 
the archetypes; if the archetypes are some kind of metaphor, this gives us a more concrete 
idea of the outcome we might expect to see, particularly in terms of neural correlates. 
However, as Hogenson (2019) points out, the theories which suggest the archetype is 
emergent from interaction with the environment do suffer from being somewhat divorced 
from the original theory of Jung because of the continued failure to set clear dividing lines up 
to set archetypes apart from other phenomena, and because of the absence of any account for 
the collective unconscious. Indeed, Knox’s attention shifting to attachment theory and child 
development (Hogenson 2019) seems almost reductive when set against a vast cross-cultural 
history of myth, symbols and dreams, and their visceral impact on the psyche.  
 
   This said, the emergent theory posited by Knox (2004) is a great contribution to the study 
of the archetypes. For example, it goes some way towards resolving the issue of an undefined 
outcome for a ‘true’ or ‘false’ condition, as if the archetypes are expressed through metaphor, 
we would expect to see activation in the brain areas outlined above. However, as Hogenson 
(2019) points out, the theory does remain divorced from many of the original complexities of 
the phenomenon and fails to resolve many important questions about the archetypes. For 
example, if they are both rooted in image-schema, how is an archetype phenomenally 
different from a standard linguistic metaphor? How do we elicit an archetypal image as 
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distinct from a standard metaphorical image? Despite providing some clarity, this again leads 
back to the same issues for testability outlined earlier in this work; the archetypes remain 
undefined, and as a result, difficult to elicit and discriminate from alternate phenomena. The 
emergent theory also does not particularly explain the affective connection between the 
(subconsciously) selected image and the archetype it represents; if the Mother archetype is 
purely based on containment, for example, why is a church an adequate symbol, but not a 
skyscraper or a restaurant? Additionally, why do the archetypes remain unconscious while 
other forms of metaphor are conscious enough to appear in our verbal behaviour? There are 
some elements of the theory which also seem confusing and discordant with their supposed 
basis; Knox appears to entirely reject innatism, and yet there are innate elements which 
underly metaphor, and the universal behaviours which support early development of image-
schemas in the first place. What would be more helpful is a clearer attempt to apply the 
image-schema theory to real cases of archetypal phenomenon, an explicit explanation for the 
role of image-schema (and how this occurs), an explanation of affect, and a fuller attempt to 
define the psychological purpose and significance of the archetypes. Instead, Knox seems to 
have discarded the theory of the archetypes in favour of pursuing theories of attachment in 
2010 and suggested that further study of the archetypes would not be productive (Hogenson, 
2019).  
 
  As outlined earlier, ‘usefulness’ should not be the sole criteria of whether or not knowledge 
is pursued. The phenomenon of the archetypes remains without full explanation, and while 
Knox made great steps towards solving this puzzle, there have since been advances in 
numerous fields (including in the work of Lakoff, whose work Knox originally drew upon) 
which could help inform the theory. The section below will therefore largely seek to 
elaborate on Knox’s original theory, with additions and challenges based on modern research. 
A Revised Theory of the Archetypes 
 
  In terms of Jungian theory itself, I earlier stated how the theory posited by Knox (2004) 
based on the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1999), to me, failed to fully explain concepts such 
as the Hero archetype as this is not built purely on spatial relations. The theory also failed to 
explain the behaviour of the archetypes that was posited by Jung (e.g. why they occur in the 
places they do, what their function might be, how cultural deviations might occur, why the 
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images often feel that they are from an Other rather than within self), nor drew a clear 
dividing line between this phenomenon and other metaphor. This again brings us back to the 
issue of falsification outlined in earlier chapters.  
 
  One of the crucial points to be taken account of in the study of the archetypes (and 
transformations) is that while the transformations of the archetypes are a relative truth 
(arguably influenced by culture, early-development and personal experiences which shape the 
symbol), archetypes (defined as a reliable process rather than a thing in and of itself) are an 
absolute. That is not to claim that archetypes are a fixed object; on the contrary, it is the belief 
of the writer that this would be an erroneous reification. It is my belief that archetypes are a 
process, present in all people wherein embodied experiences are used to represent 
psychodrama through symbols (which repeat not due to any innate image store, but due to 
unchanging parts of the human experience, such as common physiology and experiences of 
spatial relations and force dynamics). Although the transformations may be ‘infinitely 
variable’, the underlying process is fixed and unchanging. Therefore, if we can fully 
understand the process that leads to the generation of a particular symbol (i.e. 
transformation), then we have understood the archetype and should be able to make precise 
predictions about future outcomes. It should therefore be the highest priority of Jungian 
researchers to examine the conditions that elicit similar transformations in order to find 
commonalities which may provide a glimpse at the underlying process (i.e. the archetypes). 
  
     Accordingly, what I plan to do in the following section is provide the reader with a 
breakdown of how the archetypes could work, using existing theories and approaches in 
contemporary psychology (particularly neuroaesthetics), and tying them to the original theory 
of Jung. This will include the elements of innateness which could plausibly exist, as well as 
developmental and environmental factors which shape the way an archetype manifests, as 
well as a brief suggestion of what function archetypes serve. This theory will draw on, but not 
be exclusive to, the theory posited by Knox (2004). I aim to present a comprehensive idea of 
what the archetypes could be, but most crucially, attempt to grasp at why particular 
transformations are generated.   
 
  It should be noted that, in the writer’s opinion, there is some innatism involved in shaping 
the transformations of the archetypes. This could raise issues of falsification, particularly due 
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to the difficulties of determining nature versus nurture influence, but the only innate elements 
I am suggesting are those of physiology and basic emotions (which exist in or are dependent 
on subcortical areas and are thus resistant to environmental change). Basic emotions have 
also already been empirically studied and supported using selective electrical stimulations of 
neural circuitry in non-human animals.  
 
  My aim is to demonstrate how the archetypes could potentially be explained using modern 
research, avoiding mysticism and unfalsifiable concepts where possible, without reducing 
archetypes to simple biology divorced from the accompanying qualia. To follow my earlier 
criteria for good scientific research, I will aim to do following: provide alternate and null 
hypotheses; suggest a clear route for testing; define my terms as clearly as possible to allow 
for refutation and clear true/false conditions; and attempt  to establish physical means by 
which suggested causal relationships could be possible.  
 
   To be explicit in the definition of my terms to aid falsifiability; I am defining the archetypes 
as: ‘an innate process of environmental internalisation and metaphorical expression, which 
leads to the human tendency to repeat patterns in thought, observable in behaviour (including 
verbal behaviour) across time and culture’. There will be additional focus on transformations, 
which will be defined as: ‘spontaneous images (as in visions, dreams and myths) which arise 
as a metaphorical representation of the core underlying pattern’. These patterns, e.g. that of 
the Hero, Mother, or Shadow are not genetically pre-determined, but arise due to common 
ecological and developmental experiences.  
 
  My intention is to write this elaboration up ‘chronologically’, that is, in the order of 
development I feel is plausible, beginning with that which could be innate at birth, moving 
onto the internalisation and elaboration of image schemas, and how these might be moderated 
by cultural factors. I believe it may well be possible to create a formulaic map of situations 
and link them to archetypal outcomes based on this theory, but that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Throughout, I will also attempt to highlight which brain areas may be involved (in 
addition to those from metaphor processing which were outlined earlier) to help pave the way 
for future neurological research in this area, and also as an attempt to create a more falsifiable 
basis for the theory.  
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Innateness 
   I am beginning by considering the potential for innate elements of human psychology, 
which may support some of the claims for innateness in Jung’s original theory. Knox (2010) 
intensely critiques Goodwyn’s claim (2010) that Panksepp’s (1998; 2011) concept of the 7 
core emotions, can be used to explain similarities in symbolic content. However, it is exactly 
this work that I intend to draw on to counter this claim, using the very information that Knox 
outlines as their critique. 
 
     Panksepp’s work belongs to a field of research investigating basic emotions. Basic 
emotions are those which are considered psychologically primitive, genetically determined, 
and are generated by subcortical neuronal circuits. Even if we do not subscribe to Panksepp’s 
model, this much is agreed on across the four major emotion models put forward by Ekman 
and Codaro (2011); Izard (2011); Levenson (2011); and Panskeep and Watt (2011), (Tracy & 
Randles, 2011). It is also agreed upon that although environment can have a moderating 
effect on basic emotions (such as intensity and the conditions under which they arise), no 
environmental influence can create a basic emotion. This demonstrates the limited effect of 
external influences (and even higher order emotional systems) on these basic emotions. To 
give an idea of their universality, basic emotions are only considered so if they are also 
present in non-human animals (Tracy & Randles, 2011). This is highly reminiscent of Jung’s 
suggestion that there are innate, primordial elements of the archetypes. 
 
   Although Panksepp’s claim is one of a few, a brief exploration of this theory will be 
sufficient to demonstrate the point about basic emotions. Panksepp (1998; 2011) suggests that 
there are 7 core states in the mammalian brain; SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, 
PANIC and PLAY. As noted by Tracy and Randles (2011), these basic emotions are also 
largely agreed upon across the four major models, with the only difference tending to be 
slight terminology changes, e.g. SEEKING as ‘interest’ in Ekman and Codaro (2011), or 
PLAY as ‘enjoyment’ in Levenson (2011). These have all previously been empirically 
supported using causal, cross-species studies, using electrical stimulation of discrete neurons 
(Tracy & Randles, 2011). These basic emotions moderate behaviour and are conducive to the 
continued survival of the animal, factoring largely into behaviour and motivation, particularly 
in early development. For these to be genetically passed, Ekman and Codaro (2011) argue 
that these emotions must have some specific behavioural output that aids the adaptation of the 
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species and enables them to better cope with ecological challenges. As Knox (2010) 
highlights, the mid-brain areas lose plasticity very early in development, and thus these 
primitive emotions become fixed. What Knox (2010) claims is that “these circuits are those 
that control behavioural and physiological patterns of action and reaction, not subjective 
mental experience.” (Knox, 2010, p. 524). However, behaviour and physiology are arguably 
not separable from subjective experience. These emotions not only colour the nature of our 
early embodied experiences (the same embodied experiences which Knox (2004) seemed to 
be suggesting as underlying the archetypes) but dictate our willingness and likelihood to 
engage in them in the first place (Panksepp & Watt, 2011). Additionally, since these states 
are accompanied by physiological patterns and experiences, they also play a role in how we 
envision abstract concepts, as suggested by the work of Kövecses (2005) which will be 
further elaborated on below. This seems to suggest that there could indeed be basic emotions 
(i.e. innate subcortical circuits) which colour our conceptual representation and subjective 
experience of events. These subcortical systems are genetically determined, and work in 
tandem with higher order neocortical systems to produce emotional output, requiring very 
little environmental input (i.e. they are largely independent of time and culture). Notably, it is 
also highlighted that affective shift can occur in these deep subcortical systems without their 
being cognitive consciousness of the stimuli which causes the change (Tamietto and de 
Gelder, 2010, cited in Panksepp & Watt, 2011). This would suggest that these mammalian 
core states can be influenced unconsciously (which would be wholly necessary if they were 
to play a part in the archetypes) and suggests there may be a pre-determined element in the 
development of the image schemas, counter to Knox’s (2004) claim.  
 
   It should be noted that it is superfluous here to suggest which of these basic emotion 
theories we use to explain early developmental behaviour, i.e. why a child engages in the 
early SEEKING behaviour that helps shape image schemas and later cognitive development. 
It is just enough to know that they do engage in this behaviour, and that whatever basic 
emotion underlies this behaviour is likely to be pre-existent, because it is something that 
emerges reliably in every typically functioning child. The only reason it is necessary to 
acknowledge these basic emotions is to indicate that there may be some innate disposition 
underpinning image schema development (and thus archetypes and their transformations) 
which is not environmentally dependent. This would account for the emergence of common 
feeling-tones (i.e. emotional qualities underlying transformations) independent of time and 
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culture.  
 
   This provides a plausible basis, at birth, for some of the innateness Jung refers to in his 
original theory, since these affective states are common to all humans. The basic emotions 
thus provide a basis for the universality of certain behaviours (arising as a response to basic 
emotions) and emotional states throughout life, particularly in times of crisis in early 
development (Tracy & Randles, 2011); in adulthood their influence is lessened by the pre-
eminence of higher order emotions. Accordingly, if these states are involved in the affective 
similarities underlying archetypal experience, then mid-brain activity would be expected in 
archetypal experience.  
Image Schemata 
  If it is accepted that the basic emotions may underlie similar affective states (which also 
leads to some predictable and reliable ways of interacting with the environment), it is 
important to consider the means through which the environment may be internalised and 
represented, i.e. by what means does external phenomena come to be internally represented in 
the form of image schemas?  
 
  When Knox (2004) discussed image schemas, she referred to UP-DOWN, 
CONTAINMENT, PART-WHOLE as examples, drawing on the metaphor work of Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999). There is a lot of discussion in Knox’s (2004) paper of the image 
schemas and early conceptualisation and developmental changes but little discussion about 
the mechanisms underlying these conceptualisations, how precisely these support the 
archetypes, or what the limits are of these image schemas. Knox says of the archetypes: 
 
  ‘But what exactly are the processes whereby the abstract gestalts of primitive image 
schemas become elaborated into the rich psychic world of symbolic meaning and 
metaphor? Whilst image schemas can provide us with an information-processing 
model of the archetype-as-such, we also need to understand how day-to-day 
experience is internalized and linked with the image schema to create a pattern of 
representation-rich meanings… The archetype, as image schema, provides an initial 
scaffolding for this process, but the content is provided by real experience, 
particularly that of intense relationships with parents and other key attachment 
figures’. (Knox, 2004, p.10) 
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  It is unclear to me why Knox (2004) places primary influence of the content of the 
archetypal transformations experiences with caregivers, particularly when many of the 
images (as outlined in the solar phallus example) are so far removed from day-to-day 
experience. If the content were concerning immediate relationships alone, there would have 
been no need to consider primordial influences; as Palmer (1997) states,  
 
‘For Jung… a true analysis of the individual can only begin when the contents of the 
personal unconscious have been exhausted and when the focus of attention can 
therefore shift to the collective unconscious – to those irreducible and primordial 
psychic images that exist in their own right’. (Palmer, 1997, p. 101)  
 
  As is indicated here, the very nature of the collective unconscious (which Jung 
conceptualised as the basis of the archetypes) is for those images that seem beyond personal 
experience. This explanation also does little to explain the numinous element of the 
experience associated with the archetypes and their often outlandish manifestations, and thus 
seems insufficient in its current state. Further detail is needed to account for the elaborate 
form and associated affect for each archetype, e.g. the Shadow, versus the Mother, versus the 
Hero all have distinct affective associations which are not fully explained by spatial relations 
alone (but which may all begin with the internalisation of spatial relations as a foundation).  
 
    It is also important to note that the research Knox (2004) drew upon (i.e. that of the 
metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1999)) has developed further since the time of her 
writing, particularly with the addition of force-dynamics, and a fuller explanation has been 
provided for the underlying mechanisms of the embodiment. 
 
   The reason that spatial information and embodiment are so crucial in the theory of the 
archetypes, is that we see these basic primitive image schemas shaping every language in the 
world (Lakoff, 2015). This is indicative of underlying universal patterns of thought that do 
not shift, largely akin to what was originally theorised to be the case for the archetypes, 
suggesting that we could be looking at a similar or the very same phenomenon. Spatial 
information and force dynamics (as illustrated in Table 1) are embodied experiences (leading 
to image schema) which help to characterise and shape perception and conceptual 
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representations in thought and language.  
 
Table 1.  
Spatial Relations and Force Dynamics (The Embodiment Hypothesis, Lakoff, 2015).  
Spatial Relations Force Dynamics 
Deictic Center (viewpoint) Force 
Cardinal Directions (north, east, south, 
west) 
Counterforce 
Container (bounded region in space), 
interior: boundary: exterior; portal 
Compulsion 
Part-whole Enablement 
Center-periphery Support 
Axis (long, short) Access 
Front-back Pull 
Side Push 
Left, right Resistance 
Top-Bottom Inertia 
Adjacent Region Momentum 
Figure-Ground Physical Containment 
Source, path, goal Blockage 
Line Blockage Removal 
Verticality: Up-down Restraint 
Horizontality: side-to-side, back-and-forth Restraint Removal 
Region Balance 
Link (association, connection)  Stasis 
Near-far-distant (scalar) Thrust 
Facing, Opposite Friction, drag 
Intermediate Compression 
Encircling, Curving, Tangential Tension 
Attached-Separated Centrifugal force 
Collected-Distributed Centripedal force 
Merging-Diverging Entropy-Anentropy 
Accessible-Blocked Application (use of force) 
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Completed-Open-ended (path with and 
without endpoint) 
Capacity (potential force) 
Continuous, intermittent Dissipation of energy 
Length: short-long Accumulation of energy 
Instantaneous-extended  
Change in rate: acceleration-deceleration  
 
   Having a direct understanding of the underlying neurological processes here is important 
for falsification, but also provides further information about how more complex archetypes 
could come to be. 
 
Internalisation of Spatial Relations 
    In order to first establish a physical means through which this internalisation could be 
possible, (and to gain a more thorough theoretical understanding of the transformations), the 
first thing to be understood is how exactly external visual experiences and neurological 
processes are related. Through doing this, it will become more possible to understand the 
encoding of experience as visuo-spatial relationships. Some of the most fruitful research on 
this topic can be found in the field of neuroaesthetics.  
 
  Neuroaesthetics is a relatively new discipline in psychology which seeks to understand the 
biological basis of aesthetic experience (Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014). Di Dio and Gallese 
(2009) conducted a meta-analysis of findings in this field and outlined a suggested role of 
embodiment (i.e. how the human brain and body interacts with the environment, particularly 
via sensory experiences and physiology), in aesthetic experiences. This is highly relevant 
given the suggested embodiment underlying the development of image-schemas.  
 
  In their meta-analysis, Di Dio and Gallese (2009) indicate sensorimotor activation during 
the viewing of artwork as evidence for the role of embodiment in aesthetic experience. In 
relation to the sensorimotor centers, aesthetic experience has been found to elicit activation in 
the parietal regions and posterior parietal cortex. These areas respectively play a role in 
spatial sense, navigation and the integration of sensory modalities, and the dorsal stream of 
vision. This indicates a process of visuo-spatial encoding, as well as motor mapping in 
aesthetic experience (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009), which supports the role of embodiment in 
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aesthetic experience (and thus of transformations, since they 
are, as images, inherently aesthetic). This is congruent with 
the image-schema model previously proposed by Knox 
(2004), since the very act of viewing begins a process of 
encoding spatial dimensions of an experience via the parietal 
and posterior parietal cortex. It is of note here that the 
posterior parietal cortex is also involved in the mapping of 
conceptual and imagined spatial relationships (Whitlock, 
2017); i.e. the spatial relation could also be one representing 
power relations (high and low). This provides us with a 
potential means through which these spatial experiences can 
be converted into conceptual cognitive structures. 
 
    Another notable contribution from neuroaesthetics, which 
may help explain internalisation of external phenomena, is 
the mirror mechanism. The mirror mechanism is the automatic response of something 
resembling empathy and identification that exists within visual experiences; it essentially acts 
as a mental recreation of that which is physically observed. The first studies of the mirror 
mechanism were conducted on monkeys over 25 years ago, with findings showing a 
visuomotor response to watching another monkey perform an act such as ‘grasping’, a 
response which was also present when the monkey itself performed the action (Bonini, 
Maranesi, Livi, Fogassi and Rizzolatti, 2014). This empathic response within two members of 
the same species is not altogether surprising when one considers the importance of imitation 
in learning and adaptation, but what is more surprising is the observation of this visuomotor 
response when viewing an inanimate object in more recent studies. For example, Di Dio and 
Gallese (2009) discuss the work of Di Dio, Macaluso, and Rizzolatti (2007), a study in which 
participants viewed classical sculptures and displayed activation of the ventral premotor 
cortex (area F5, associated with mirror neurons) and the posterior parietal cortex (which is 
responsible for both sensory integration and motor planning, and which was also discussed 
earlier as being involved in imagined and concrete spatial relations.) That is to say, even 
though the viewers were only viewing a still sculpture, the subconscious response is to then 
imagine and mirror the implied movement of the artist. As Di Dio and Gallese (2009) put it, 
this suggests that there is a ‘relationship between embodied simulation-driven empathic 
Figure 1: Biological versus non-biological 
effectors. (Di Dio, Cesare, Higuchi, 
Roberts, Vogt and Rizzolatti, 2013, 
p.433). 
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feelings in the observer and the visible traces of the artist’s creative gestures’. Much of the 
previous research into mirror neurons has been concerned with identifying their role in social 
interaction (specifically during observation and execution of an action) (Kilner and Lemon, 
2013) but the presence of mirror neurons when viewing inanimate objects has fascinating 
implications for what it is possible to internalise, and the breadth of possible sources for 
spatial relations (and the concepts which arise from them). Further studies have also shown 
that the mirror mechanism activates regardless of if the effector is biological or non-
biological (e.g. a hand versus an arrow) provided that the motion itself is biological, as is 
illustrated in Figure 1 (Di Dio, Cesare, Higuchi, Roberts, Vogt and Rizzolatti, 2013). 
 
   This suggests that viewing others, viewing inanimate objects which have been crafted, and 
viewing non-biological actors may all provide a basis for embodied experiences and thus 
spatial relations which abstract reasoning may be built upon. However, it is important to note 
that the mirroring is not present when the motion is non-biological, which may make a 
dividing line between what it is and what it is not possible to draw a spatial map from simply 
from viewing.  
 
   While this is speculative, it is interesting to consider how this may apply to certain viewed 
experiences, e.g. the growth of a plant, or the motion of a twig drifting downstream, or even 
the viewing of a heavily industrialised city. To what extent do we internalise and create 
spatial maps of the world around us, and how does this contribute to our available image-
schemas? It is important not to overstate this speculation, as the possible functions of mirror 
neurons in themselves have already been vastly overstated in the last decade, but for a theory 
like the archetypes and transformations which centers so heavily around embodiment and 
identification, it does seem fruitful to further research the limits of this mechanism; without 
knowing the full range of what is possible (and what is not), it remains difficult to map and 
test what can fall within the parameters. However, it does seem unlikely, based on this and 
the other routes for internalisation outlined above, that image-schemas are rooted purely in 
early development. 
 
   More detailed neurological accounts of internalisation of image schema can also be found 
in neural dynamic models of spatial relation, such as that by Richter, Lins and Schöner 
(2017). This model uses dynamic field theory (DFT), which suggests that activation fields 
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have metric dimensions, with objects of interest continually updated. In DFT, neurons 
respond to external stimuli and can have inhibitory effects on local neurons when making 
decisions about key features, e.g. in activation of neurons for a colour field, the presence of 
red stimuli may have a stimulating effect on a ‘red node’ and inhibitory effect on other local 
colour nodes. Peaks in activity are thus processed as indicative of the presence of one item 
and the non-presence of another. This simulation-based model allows for amodal perception, 
and also suggests the involvement of the parietal cortex. Here, the parietal cortex is 
considered as the centre for encoding bimodal signals, i.e. of features and spatial relations, 
from the ventral stream (Wiebe, Morton, Buss, & Spencer, 2014). This gives a brief idea of 
some of the neural processes which may potentially underlie the conversion of external 
stimuli into conceptual structures.  
 
   The work of Piaget and Inhelder’s (1969) suggested that cognitive development in children 
begins with sensorimotor experience. Physical experiences (internalised through processes as 
outlined above) become the first cognitive steps, and these experiences are then used to 
metaphorically map abstract thoughts and situations. This indicates the potential for a 
continued relationship between embodiment and abstract thought in later life; by necessity, 
those things which cannot be understood concretely are metaphorically substituted (as 
outlined in the earlier discussion of conceptual metaphor theory). This enables them to be 
understood through analogy, i.e. conceptual representations which, at core, are based on 
spatial relations (possibly due to the ‘conceptual’ and ‘literal’ flexibility of the posterior 
parietal cortex) which have been encoded through the processes above.  
   
  In fact, problem-solving through analogy is an everyday phenomenon, with people drawing 
frequently on embodiment to help resolve knowledge gaps. For example, when explaining 
complicated or disconnected ideas, there is an increased use of bodily gesture, which is 
thought to support problem-solving by facilitating working memory (Keefer & Landau, 
2016). Metaphorical structure-mapping, wherein an unrelated concept is mapped onto an 
abstract concept to aid perceptual representation (as earlier discussed in conceptual metaphor 
theory), is also common, though it is less automatic and can require active thought or 
linguistic cues to trigger relevant structural maps (Keefer & Landau, 2016). It is this that I 
feel leads to the emergence of the katabasis mythology only after the dawn of agriculture; 
humans had to physically experience seeing something go down into the ground (a seed), and 
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then being ‘reborn’ (as a plant) before being able to conceptualise the phenomenon within 
themselves; before agriculture, there was no physical experience to act as conceptual 
scaffolding for this thought. 
 
   Although this is speculative, it therefore seems plausible that archetypal experience arises 
as a kind of subconscious conceptual metaphor, particularly aimed at resolving subconscious 
problems involving high levels of affect. Transformations (as the source) may thus emerge as 
part of a class-inclusion process, being subconsciously selected as a good structural match 
with the target (this being the problem the individual is facing), due to image-schemas 
grounded in early sensorimotor experience, or due to compounding associations and affect. 
This class-inclusion process, in turn, may then shape our attitudes towards, and relationship 
with, the target and source objects due to their various shared affective and experiential 
associations. For this to be passed evolutionarily, similar to the basic emotions, it therefore 
follows that this must either have some adaptive benefit, or else may simply be an 
evolutionary by-product of our problem-solving faculties which developed to solve material 
problems.  
 
Spatial Relations and Affect 
   For image schemas to form the basis for transformations (as a highly affective experience), 
there must also be a relation between spatial relations and the affect that they are used to 
represent. It is therefore useful to examine the relationship between aesthetic and emotional 
experience, to see at which point these two experiences connect. This, in turn, will help 
provide an idea of which brain areas would be involved in an experience of archetypal 
transformations, since these are also inherently a visual experience.  
 
  To draw again on neuroaesthetics, in the analysis conducted by Di Dio and Gallese (2009), 
aesthetic preference was shown to be associated with the right anterior insular and right 
amygdala (Di Dio, et al. 2007). The former here is responsible for emotional awareness (Gu, 
Hof, Friston,& Fan, 2013) and was also found to be active during figurative metaphor work 
(Schmidt and Seger, 2009), while the latter is responsible for emotional processing (Janak & 
Tye, 2015). Di Dio and Gallese (2009) suggest this is indicative of a comparison being made 
between the aesthetic experience and the observer’s own experiences, which could provide an 
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avenue for the interplay between spatial relations and affect. 
 
   This said, amygdala activity was only found when participants were asked to make 
aesthetic judgements (Dio Dio, Macaluso and Rizzolati, 2007) which calls into question 
whether or not activity would be shown in this area when experiencing archetypal 
transformations. This is because it suggests that the viewer’s emotional processing may be a 
result of an evaluative process of personal associations to determine the beauty of the piece, 
rather than as an instinctive response to aesthetic experience. However, the transformations 
are highly affective experiences, and known for the visceral impression they supposedly 
impress upon the psyche (Jung describes them as having a “mystical aura about [their] 
numinosity, and it has a corresponding effect upon the emotions” 1947, pp. 205-206). With 
this powerful affective response and knowing that transformations are a moment of 
unconscious emotion being made conscious (i.e. being brought into emotional awareness, as 
is one of the suggested functions of the right anterior insular), it is difficult to imagine that the 
anterior insular and amygdala would not be involved.  
     
   It is interesting to note that these brain areas have also been found to be associated with 
emotional processing in sleep, which is what we would have expected to find if dreams did 
indeed serve the compensatory function that Jung (1964) suggested. For example, amygdala 
activity increases during rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep (Koyama, Aoyagi and Toyomaki, 
2011), which is when dreaming occurs. This amygdala activity is also thought to be 
responsible for attenuating responses to stress during REM (Wellman, Fitzpatrick, Hallum, 
Sutton, Williams and Sanford, 2017) and further findings have also found a relationships 
between REM and mood disorders, e.g. in bipolar it was found that dreams of death are 
common and precede an upward mood shift (Beauchemin & Hays, 1996). Alternate research 
has also found that the anterior insular may be involved in sleep-regulation (Chiang, Yugay, 
Patxot, Özçivit, Hu and Lu, 2016), and also that sleep deprivation (and resultant increased 
activity in the amygdala-anterior insular pathways) leads to higher rates of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) (Schott, Germaine and Milad, 2015). These studies therefore indicate 
the importance of REM (and thus dreaming) in normal emotional processing. This arguably 
suggests that amygdala activity (and in fact dream content) during REM has a direct 
influence on mood and emotional processing in waking hours, which is also what would be 
expected for an experience of transformations manifesting as a way to consolidate emotions 
Jungian Archetypes: A Step Towards Scientific Enquiry - Kyah McDonald 
 
70 
 
during sleep. This is further supported by Malinowski and Horton’s (2015) work suggesting 
that metaphor is used during dream-states to assimilate emotional memories. Combined with 
the above research from neuroaesthetics, if we do take archetypal transformations to be a 
kind of metaphor processing it thus seems increasingly probable that archetypal experiences 
would elicit activation in the amygdala and the right anterior insular. 
 
   An area in which we might expect transformation experience to differ to typical aesthetic 
experience is a lesser role of the cognitive faculties since Jung suggested archetypal 
experience is most likely to occur when conscious defences are relaxed. This is an important 
deviation from standard aesthetic experience, as the primacy of cognition in our responses to 
art has previously been considered as the norm (Di Dio and Gallese, 2009). By contrast, 
transformations would be subject to less influence from the cognitive faculties because they 
are not conscious experiences. Mills (2012) elaborates on this, suggesting that the archetypes 
and collective unconscious, like drives, are not faculties of cognition but are rather a pre-
conscious process, from which the transformations arise as highly affective and numinous 
phenomenon. In terms of falsification, this differentiation may provide an important 
neurological differentiation between symbolic experience and typical aesthetic experience or 
other forms of metaphor, reflecting the significant difference in qualia, i.e. that the archetypes 
often feel that they come from outside the self. It also follows that if this is the case, there 
should be a distinctly different activity in the right anterior insular before and after exposure 
to the right anterior insular, due to its role in emotional awareness. 
 
 From Spatial Maps to Transformations 
   The findings in neuroaesthetics give us something of an idea of which neural correlates 
may underly the experience of a transformation and how they come to be; during aesthetic 
experience, we are not simply viewing, but also creating corresponding spatial maps which 
may also call on our personal experiences and affective associations with this map. For 
example, in viewing a person stood on a cliff, a person who fell down the stairs in early 
childhood, or from a high wall, may call upon that spatial relationship in tandem with 
personal experience, leading to an association of that mapping with fear. That is to say, visual 
experiences and representations are often inherently connected to physically embodied motor 
and affective responses. For instance, Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, and Schjeldahl 
(2005), found that a brightness and verticality are often used to represent abstract ideas 
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without an explicit physical basis, such as ‘valence’ or ‘power’.     
 
    Meier et al. (2005) also suggest persistent associations between various physical states can 
influence later affective attributions. They suggest that daylight hours are associated with 
receiving various rewards such as food or social interaction, while at night, we are less 
evolutionary equipped to deal with environmental dangers or predators. As a result of this, 
bright perceptual input becomes entwined with positive affect, and dark perceptual input 
becomes entwined with negative affect. This is a lived truth that arises predictably as a result 
of our evolutionary history and biology, and again suggests an element of innatism and 
physiology that shapes our affective response to a visual experience. This is not just true for 
light levels and distance: 
 
  ‘valence can be represented in terms of brightness, and that divinity is represented on 
a vertical dimension. There is also evidence that the concept of similarity is 
represented in terms of verticality, physical force and size. Furthermore, studies have 
shown that importance is represented in terms of weight, and that social proximity is 
represented as temperature.’ - Zanolie, Dantzig, Boot, Wijnen, Schubert, Giessner and 
Pecher (p.57, 2012) 
 
    In terms of how this may occur, Lakoff (2015) (in discussing the embodiment hypothesis) 
suggests that the root of these connections is spike-time dependent plasticity. This is when 
events that happen temporally close together become bound together as part of a scenario or 
more technically speaking, when a presynaptic cell fires and a post-synaptic cell fires shortly 
afterwards, the synapse between them is strengthened. This allows us to develop scenarios 
and concepts which are moderated by coordinating circuits. Lakoff (2015) mentions this in 
relation to integration and neural bindings in metaphor (e.g. in early childhood, if you are 
loved, you are often held close, which leads to warmth, hence ‘love is warmth’) and it is just 
as relevant here for understanding the metaphorical way in which archetypes are presented.  
 
  Because the scenarios and associations that we develop are implicit and can often not be 
consciously checked, it is possible that they can become over-generalised to content with 
similar sensory encoding, even if the object itself is not the same. For example, someone with 
a mother who treats them distantly or coldly may end up with a scenario in which the mother 
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archetype becomes a collection of the following: [SEEKING], [container], [verticality: up], 
[distant], [resistance], coupled with the resultant basic affect, e.g. rage or panic. These things 
may bind together to become a scenario, so in later life, when a similar scenario is evoked, 
e.g. for a woman of interest who is aloof, although not conscious, the same neural bindings 
fire and lead to the same affect being generated. 
 
    When this emotional conflict happens below the level of consciousness, the result may be 
spontaneous images, which are a structural match because they utilise the same spatial 
relations and force dynamics which are relevant for the scenario. This may well be the basis 
of what we would term ‘the Mother archetype’, i.e. a common collection of associations that 
arises due to most people having or experiencing a mother. Lakoff (2015) discusses 
coordinating circuits, which is the idea that we have neural binding circuits for these 
scenarios, which are gated – over-generalisation then, may arise from stimuli which 
modulates the gate and activate these circuits provided enough of the underlying sensory 
information is consistent.  
 
  Internal experience having an interconnected relationship with the external environment is 
not a new idea only found in the field of psychology, but also appears in fine art, or in 
literature in the form of pathetic fallacy. Although neuroaesthetics is a relatively new field, 
this is a phenomenon that has been within human awareness for quite some time, and 
arguably is part of why it comes as no surprise to us when we read sentences such as ‘the 
clouds were sullen’. This statement is not taken literally, nor seen just as text, but instead 
gives us an image of the cloud with accordant visual properties to those we associate with 
‘sullen’. Here, the theory again links back into metaphor; when saying “sullen”, it is unlikely 
that those reading envisioned the clouds as bright and white, nor envisioned that they were 
moving quickly, for example. It is far more likely that instead, the reader envisioned them as 
a darker colour, such as a dull grey, moving slowly by if moving at all. This is particularly 
important to note, as here, we begin to see how although visual properties were not disclosed, 
they were inferred and encoded in relation to their emotional content. 
 
 This indicates that abstract properties are not just assigned to metaphors that we project, but 
that spatial qualities and physical features such as colour are also encoded for objects even 
when they were not disclosed or present, based on their affective association. Our ability to 
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metaphorically group items together seems to be based on these hidden ‘nodes’ of 
information. 
 
    This leads us on to synaesthetic correspondence. Although the above provides a theoretical 
link between visual experience and affect, another question that arises in explaining the 
archetypes is why particular substitutions are made, i.e. ‘Why does the Transformation 
appear like this?’. Why the earth as the Mother? Why the sun and moon as siblings, or 
husband and wife? It is possible to understand this through synaesthetic correspondence. This 
is important to understand in order to further falsify the theory and delimit the range of 
transformations from ‘infinite’ to ‘those which are a match for associated sensory 
experience’.  
 
  Synaesthetic correspondence is an aspect of neuroaesthetics which has recently come to 
light, showing that unrelated information is often linked by similar sensory encoding. For 
example, recent work with taste-shape matches amongst non-synaesthetes show that rounded 
shapes which were also symmetrical with few elements were likely to be judged as sweet, 
while asymmetrical, angular shapes with many elements were likely to be branded as bitter 
and unpleasant (Salgado-Montejo, Alvarado, Velasco, Salgado, Hasse, and Spence, 2015). 
Symmetry corresponding with positive valence is not an entirely surprising finding, as this 
correlates with human ideas of beauty and harkens back to evolutionary fitness and sexual 
selection; significant facial asymmetry is often found in chromosomal disorders (Hoyme, 
1994, cited in Rhodes, Zebrowitz, Clark, Kalick, Hightower, McKay, 2001). There are also 
long-standing ideas that beauty has a connection to truth and virtue (Bommel, 2015) which 
arise from our more recent cultural and religious history (i.e. concepts of God given beauty) 
which in itself is an association which may arise from synaesthetic correspondence.  
 
   Synaesthetic correspondences provide a lens for understanding why symbols come in the 
forms they do, and also provide a contribution for understanding why there are 
commonalities in representations. For example, in the study above, both evolutionary and 
environmental factors could lead to the direct connecting of two pieces of seemingly 
unrelated information; symmetry and beauty. There are countless other experiences which 
may also be routinely connected (for example, in the study above, we see ‘few elements’ and 
‘sweet’ which more generally may be ‘simple’ and ‘sweet’ or ‘angular’, perhaps akin to 
sharp, as ‘bitter’), stemming either from evolutionary or environmental factors. This may 
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eventually be mapped in a more comprehensive way than has been established at present, but 
these relationships make visible some of the underlying sensory and conceptual connections 
that exist as a result of the embodied aspect of experiences.  
 
   For example, take the sun and moon mythology (which appear frequently as 
transformations for the God or Mother archetype) which is common across many 
cultures. Many things exist above us; clouds, birds, the stars – but we seem most compelled 
to write mythology about the sun and moon, particularly framing them as brother and sister, 
husband and wife, or both. Why could this be? Perhaps because they correspond with a 
collection of abstract qualities that arise from early image-schemas. They have verticality, 
they are distant, and our sensory experience of them is as bright, and they are large (and thus 
also draw a great deal of visual attention), with the varying heat of the sun (which could be 
interpreted as nourishing or punishing) being climate dependent. According to the studies 
outlined above, this psychologically corresponds to valence, divinity and power (Zanolie et 
al. 2012).  
 
  Supporting the implications of this research, the mythological pattern also follows this 
trend; the Japanese Tsukiyomi (moon god) and Amaterasu Omikami (sun gooddess), who is 
both Tsukiyomi's sister and wife; the Norse, Sunna (sun goddess) and Mani (Moon God) who 
is her brother; in Greek, Selene (moon goddess) and Helios (sun god) are siblings, with the 
addition of Eos (dawn Goddess). 
 
   It is of interest to note that Egypt is something of an exception here: Egyptian Ra (the 
Sun God) was actually married to (or the child of) Hathor who epitomised Egyptian 
femininity and was considered the 'mother'. Although Hathor occupied the typical function of 
other moon goddesses, she also had a dual aspect of being Ra's feminine counterpart or a 
maternal figure, one considered wrathful, and one gentle (which is reminiscent of earlier 
discussions of the Mother archetype and the Earth mother). Hathor was also typically 
represented by cattle (which was a symbol of nourishment in Egypt and many other cultures) 
and it is actually Khonsu (whose name interestingly means 'traveller' and was also referred to 
as 'pathfinder', which links us back to the ‘path’ image-schema) who acted as the moon God.  
 
   Understanding the basis for these deviances is exactly the place where we may find the 
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precise workings of the archetype; what commonalities is it possible to find, and what causes 
variance in transformations? When Herodotos (an ancient Greek historian) visited Egypt in 
the 7th century, he joked that their culture was “in most of their manners and customs, [the 
Egyptians are] exactly reverse the common practise of mankind” because of their climate, the 
patterns of the rivers, and the more active position Egyptian women possessed in society 
(Erman, 1971, p. 1). Could this be in some way responsible for the variation in their 
transformations? At present it is impossible to say, but this in itself provides one potential 
avenue for study for those preferring a general systematic approach to the collection of 
knowledge.  
 
  To return to the point of the metaphorical connection between the sun, moon, and parental 
figures. It is not entirely surprising that one should be attributed masculine and the other 
feminine; the typical experience of a child throughout the ages has been to grow up with two 
primary figures above, one masculine, one feminine, both of whom are life-giving and 
protective forces and much larger than the child. When the developing person is then 
presented with two unknown objects above (which also correspond with dual figures, with 
the underlying synaesthetic correspondence of power, valence and divinity), they must then 
ask ‘what is it?’. It is unsurprising then that the person concludes that they must share 
similarities to their parents as they share a multitude of abstract qualities. The person thus 
categorises them together, and the sun and moon become a God and Goddess, who are either 
brother and sister or husband and wife (and sometimes both). They could not be human as a 
matter of relativity – they are higher, larger, brighter, they must be something more powerful 
than a human, more life-giving, more divine. This was not merely a weak explanation for 
something that the generations of the past did not understand, it was a psychological truth 
about the function of the sun and moon as life-giving forces. 
 
   The sun is indeed life-giving; without it, plants would not grow, the cattle could not eat, and 
humans could not navigate. For a human who reasons through function, this is what the sun is 
‘for’. In modern secular society, we instead suppose that everything is for nothing, there is no 
‘purpose’, per se, to anything and the causality is in fact reversed; we evolved to adapt to our 
surroundings, what grew is what could grow under these conditions. And this is true also – 
this is the material truth, logos, but it does not stop the sun having a powerful emotional 
impression, nor from being life-giving, or from inspiring a sense of the sublime when we 
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consider, for example, how far it is from us, or how small we are by comparison. The two are 
not in conflict with each other except when one side insists that the other must submit to it; 
the lens of the emotional truth is not appropriate for understanding the material history of 
the sun, and equally, the lens of material truth is not appropriate for understanding the 
emotional relevance of the sun. Material history and human experience run concurrently, they 
are interlinked and dynamic – but they are not the same and it is a mistake to view them as 
so. This brings us back to the earlier discussion of the subjective and objective experience 
that Humboldt, Goethe and Jung tried to capture.  
 
Cultural Influence on Transformations 
    As stated above, it is highly plausible that as well as developmental experiences, culture 
may also have a mediating effect on transformations. This can even take primacy over the 
physiology as a source domain, as is explored in the work of Kövecses (2005).  
 
  Kövecses discusses the physiological basis for universal metaphor and states that general 
metaphors are often universal. For example, in discussing anger, ‘angry person as a 
pressurised container’ is near universal (Kövecses 2000, cited in Kövecses 2005). However, 
as metaphors become more specific, cross-cultural influences begin to emerge. For example, 
anger in the stomach is specific to Japan; in Zulu culture it is in the heart; in China, the anger 
that fills the container is an excess energy called qi  (gas, a comparison which stems from 
Chinese philosophy and medicine); and in English metaphor, fluid.  
 
   This indicates that while a general metaphor is universal, the higher levels of elaboration 
are likely to be subject to cultural influence. Due to the neural plasticity needed for this kind 
of environmental influence, it seems to be the case that subcortical areas would have to work 
in tandem with ‘higher’ brain areas to develop metaphors on the specific level. It is difficult 
to tell at this stage whether this would still be classed as a transformation, as due to the 
cultural influence, these transformations may be more conscious, and resultantly not as driven 
by basic emotions and unconscious influences so much as higher order affect.  
 
   In relation to embodied experiences, ‘anger as heat’ also appears across many cultures, and 
appears to be embedded in the underlying physiological reaction caused by anger; the skin 
grows hot and there is an increase in blood pressure (Kövecses, 2005), which contributes to 
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the frequent (and often subconscious) choice to use heat as a metaphorical representation for 
anger.  
 
  This, in part, would lend further evidence to Jung’s argument for innateness, as it is true that 
our physiology is unchanging over our (relatively) short history, and as mentioned earlier, it 
could well be that our physiology is part of the ‘innate base’, akin to the ‘biological instincts’ 
that comes to colour our symbolic representation. This would be congruent with what Jung 
suggested towards the end of his career and in his posthumously published work.  
 
‘[The collective unconscious] can no more be a product without history than is the 
body in which it exists. By “history” I do not mean fact that the mind builds itself up 
by conscious reference to the past through language and other cultural traditions. I’m 
referring to the biological, prehistoric, and unconscious development of the mind in 
archaic man, whose psyche was still close that of the animal.’ (Jung, 1964, p.57) 
 
   However, as Kövecses (2005) highlights, the picture is not quite so simple; ‘heat’ has risen 
and fallen over time with its popular use as a conceptual metaphor for anger. For example, 
before the year 850, heat-related words for anger in English only stood at 1.59%, sharply 
rising in the years 850-950 and then decreasing again to 6.22% between the years 950-1050 
(Gevaert, 2001, cited in Kövecses. 2005). This suggests the presence of other mediating 
variables which actually take precedence over physiology. This may again indicate the role of 
cultural influences at this level, since there is variation emerging over time.  
Possible Theory Testing 
 
  The aim of this reformulation was to make the theory of the Jungian archetypes more 
falsifiable and more amenable to scientific enquiry. For the sake of illustration purposes, and 
in order to demonstrate that this has been achieved, I will now outline an example of the sort 
of simple and experiment which could be used to test this theory. 
 
   An initial test may be to investigate whether there really is an association between 
transformations and simple image schema. This experiment may be as simple as conducting 
as a repeated measures study, with one IV (reflective) at two levels; sensory-correspondent or 
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not sensory-correspondent, and the DV as how often the image is chosen. Participants could 
be presented with the word for an archetypal pattern, e.g. ‘Hero’, followed by two images of 
visuo-spatial orientations (or simple animations to better capture force dynamics or 
transitional image schema, but each using simple black circles, except when shape or colour 
is relevant to the visual input being tested), one reflective of the underlying sensory encoding 
and the other not (e.g. a light circle and a dark circle to correspond to valence) in accordance 
with the work outlined above. The participant will be asked which image or animation most 
accurately represents the word. It is anticipated that the participant will choose the media 
with sensory-correspondence more often than the one without sensory-correspondence.  
 
Research Hypothesis: Participants will choose the media with sensory-correspondence with 
significantly higher frequency than the image which does not have sensory correspondence.  
 
Null Hypothesis: Whether the image has sensory correspondence with the concept or not will 
have no influence on how often the image is selected.  
 
   If the research hypothesis was supported, this could be continued across various sensory 
inputs and positioning in order to create a physical representation of the archetype made from 
basic shapes and spatial configurations. For example, testing could be done to see if 
verticality is significant in the image-schema underlying the ‘hero’ concept, or if path would 
be. Through this, we could essentially produce an ‘image’ of every claimed Jungian 
archetype (by gradually combining those sensory impressions which are relevant). 
 
  Once a physical representation of the archetype was established, the study could be 
reversed, with the physical representation being presented first, placing and asking 
participants to then select between ‘hero’ and ‘trickster’ for example. It is difficult to generate 
a hypothesis for this without the prior work being done on each variable in isolation, but for 
example:  
 
Research Hypothesis: Participants will select the word ‘hero’ more often than ‘trickster’ 
when the image presented first contains the elements of verticality, brightness and path from 
down to up rather than up to down.  
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Null Hypothesis: The elements of verticality, brightness and path from down to up will have 
no effect on which image is selected.  
 
  There would be a lot of testing to do in order to even reach this stage. However, this once 
again opens the door for normal science for the archetypes, as outlined in Kuhn’s (1970) 
work. This would highlight which sensory influences are most important for each archetype, 
and, following Lakoff’s (2015) work on coordinating circuits, we would be able to see how 
many sensory correspondences are needed in order to modulate the circuit gates for a given 
archetype and trigger activation. If successful, this may allow us to discern what can and 
what cannot be an archetypal transformation, as we would know how many corresponding 
synaesthetic elements would be needed to activate the circuit (i.e. establishing an activation 
threshold). For example, there may be no difference in selection when attempting to represent 
Hero simply through brightness; it may need to be brightness and verticality; or brightness, 
verticality and something to stimulate a particular affective response, in order to modulate the 
circuit gates, leading to a significant difference in selection rate. Accordingly, we would then 
be able to say that anything that did not include those features did not represent that particular 
archetype, because it would not meet the requirements to activate the circuit. If viable, this 
would allow us to limit the “infinite variety” (Jung, 1954a/1975, p.81, CW 9 pt.1, para 156) 
initially suggested for the archetypes.  
 
   Additionally, by presenting the image first, the selection process should be mostly intuitive 
and based on subconscious inclinations. When switching to the word following the image, 
this implicit process may be made conscious in a way that ought to be akin to archetypal 
transformations. In aid of falsification for researchers with access to an fMRI, one might 
therefore predict that this will elicit activity in the parietal regions, the posterior parietal 
cortex, the right anterior insular, the amygdala, the angular gyrus, the left-inferior frontal 
gyrus and potentially the ventral premotor cortex when the emotional scenario given involves 
implied movement. How this differs from a metaphor is that the process is largely 
unconscious and acts as a subconscious learning tool, with higher affect involved. This 
should lead to differing activity in the right anterior insular, and higher activity in the 
amygdala compared to a standard metaphor.  
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Conclusions  
 
  Early sensorimotor experiences, shaped by reliable basic emotions, environmental factors, 
and common associations between embodied states (moderated by cultural differences) all 
come together to shape the way we encode experience. Through conceptual metaphor theory 
and the processes of internalisation, we can begin to see a subconscious and continuous 
process of identification with our environment, utilising metaphor to bridge the gaps in our 
knowledge. The work by Kövecses (2005) indicates that even our most general metaphors 
can have multiple groundings, from our physiological responses to our environment, and in 
the work by Meier and Robinson (2005) we can see how continued associative links may 
plausibly be responsible for how we encode affect. Accordingly, here I will differ from Knox 
(2004) and Merchant (2009) in considering the archetypes as particularly a product of our 
early developmental experiences; as long as new embodied experiences continue to occur 
(especially drastic ones, now often facilitated by technology), then it follows that the 
potential archetypal transformations (and thus conceptual metaphorical structures) would 
expand as our capacity to identify with our environment expands. 
 
     I have posited that the experience of archetypal transformations is a method of 
subconscious expression and potentially a form of problem-solving. As discussed earlier, the 
transformations arise as a result of basic emotions, which have evolutionarily ensured our 
survival as a species. As a result, they emerge with visceral affect and are often associated 
with a sense of urgency. The transformations are those conceptual metaphors which arise 
subconsciously, perhaps when these subcortical structures (responsible for basic emotions) 
are activated, but the problem (i.e. knowledge of that which is subconsciously perceived 
threat to survival or health) is pre-conscious. This is then symbolically represented (with 
symbols chosen according to synesthetic correspondence with the target item) when 
conscious defences are lowered (as in dreams, fantasy or mythology). The process through 
which this occurs is through the utilisation of metaphorical substitutions which arise from 
embodied experiences and physiology, and at higher levels of specificity, culture. The reason 
for the primacy of embodied experiences and physiology is because cognitive development in 
children begins with sensorimotor experiences (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). These concrete 
experiences are then used to metaphorically map non-concrete concepts. Appropriate 
metaphors are chosen in accordance with a process akin to synaesthetic correspondence, 
Jungian Archetypes: A Step Towards Scientific Enquiry - Kyah McDonald 
 
81 
 
which is when unrelated information is connected by its underlying sensory encoding. For 
example, I discussed earlier that the Wise Old Man archetype need not be a philosopher, but 
is instead any figure which serves to provide guidance and sound judgement. What this can 
be further broken down into is a series of sensorimotor commonalities and associated affect, 
arising from a combination of physiology and developmental experiences. For example, in 
this case, Wise Old Man could be embodied as The Self experiencing primitive ‘SEEKING’ 
behaviour and interacting with a ‘higher than self’ spatial relationship combined with 
‘CARE’. Commonalities in the metaphors used to represent these affective and spatial 
relations are explained by a combination of physiology, the lack of plasticity in the 
mammalian brain (which both account for elements of what one might refer to as innatism), 
as well as universal commonalities in embodied experiences which arise from environmental 
constants. Examples of these include the laws of physics and revolutionary societal changes 
(such as the shift from hunter-gatherer to agriculture), which lead to similar sources for the 
subconscious representation of psychodrama. Deviations in the metaphors can occur at the 
specific level and these changes are often drawn from long-standing cultural trends, as 
suggested by the work of Kövecses (2005). The purpose of these transformations (and the 
archetypal process underlying them) is to prompt reflection or moderate behaviour in order to 
ensure health or survival. This separates them from other metaphors, as their associated affect 
is much stronger because of their evolutionary function to ensure the immediate survival of 
the organism, as opposed to the domestic reasoning associated with other conceptual 
metaphors.  
 
   This is similar to Knox’s (2004) theory of the archetypes but differs in that I see no reason 
why the process of acquiring embodied models would be primarily shaped by early 
relationships with caregivers. As long as new embodied experiences occur and new affective 
associations arise, the capacity to draw new analogies will also expand. This is due to a 
continued process of identification and internalisation of our external environments. Physical 
experiences thereby provide new pathways for problem solving; myths and dreams are not 
filling gaps in logos, they are ways of discussing and resolving emotional truths as we, as 
conscious and reflective beings, navigate a psychological landscape coloured by (sometimes 
maladaptive) emotions which once acted as a guide to ensure our survival. Archetypes and 
transformations are not an accident but an essential part of our lives as humans living in a 
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society, acting as a way of representing and reflecting on the universal patterns and scenarios 
that make up our existence as human beings. 
 
  There are various other issues which are not touched on here. For example, I do not discuss 
Jung’s theory of synchronicity. This theory concerned ‘meaningful coincidences’ and was 
thought in some way to provide explanation for the archetypes. The reason for not touching 
on this is that it would be easy for this to become a discussion of physics, evolution and 
entropy. Synchronicity is also well-known for having many falsification issues of its own, 
which would need re-evaluation in light of modern evidence. In a paper which already 
touches on a wide range of topics, I feel it would be unwise to go further afield and include 
this here, although seeing how it might work in conjunction in synchronicity may be 
something to consider for future research. 
 
    Another construct I do not particularly mention by name is the collective unconscious. In 
the original theory, Jung suggests the collective unconscious as a kind of store for 
predetermined contents and behaviours, with the archetype as templates as fixed types which 
would emerge (e.g. Trickster, Shadow, etc), and their manifestations as the observable 
phenomenon (which I have referred to here as the transformations). The reason for not 
discussing this explicitly is that there is no apparent need for the collective unconscious as 
separate from the archetypal process, if one takes the view that genetically fixed brain 
structures and common environmental factors are responsible for the commonality in the 
transformations. In the theory outlined above, I feel everything necessary to create the 
observable phenomenon is accounted for by a combination of universal environmental and 
innate factors. Perhaps these, combined, could be considered a kind of ‘collective 
unconscious’ – a universally shared set of spatial relations, force dynamics and basic sensory 
associations, which the transformations arise from. However, I do not see any need for this 
term, especially since it is suggestive of a kind of archaic collective pool of knowledge that I 
do not see evidence (or need) for in explaining the archetypes and their transformations.  
 
   Finally, I have not much mentioned individuation here. Individuation is the Jungian telos 
achieving mental balance, where neither conscious or unconscious content are causing undue 
stress on the other. Although not discussed here, I feel above all that individuation may be an 
awareness of the processes above and could therefore be reframed as a metacognitive process 
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whereby individuals become aware of these implicit learning processes. Perhaps similar to 
the phenomenon of mindfulness, individuation may be a process wherein individuals become 
able to consciously shift executive function to be aware of themselves, using transformations 
as tools for reflection and establishing personal well-being. However, again, how exactly this 
fits in with the theory above may be a matter for further research.  
 
   I recognise the failure to fully explore these as a limitation of this work, but my modest 
hope is that what I have stated is simply a step in the right direction. The above work is an 
elaboration on the theory put forward by Knox (2004), with the inclusion of comparisons 
with neuroaesthetics (and suggestions about possible shared neural-correlates), ideas about 
the potential role of synesthetic correspondence, further detailing on metaphor theory and 
embodiment based on the more recent work of Lakoff (2015), suggestions of how archetypal 
transformations could arise, and a proposal for scientific enquiry to begin narrowing the 
range of outcomes which could be attributed to an archetype. I thereby hope to have aided 
falsification and furthered the grounds of scientific enquiry for this theory.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Schmidt and Seger (2009) Table illustrating metaphor imaging literature.  
 
 
 
